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The metatheory on the democratic process poses a conceptual framework for 
the empirical analysis of democratic processes in liberal democracies. A model 
of democratic processes is being developed which proceeds from certain meta-
theoretical presuppositions. It distinguishes, inter alia, between three subsy-
stems of the political system and defines their relevant collective actors. 
Moreover, a concept of political structures and political performance is being 
proposed to provide theoretically for an empirical explanation of diverse pro-
cess phenomena by different structural arrangements in liberal democracies. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Metatheorie des demokratischen Prozesses ist ein begrifflicher Bezugsrah-
men zur empirischen Analyse der demokratischen Prozesse in den liberalen 
Demokratien. Ausgehend von bestimmten metatheoretischen Grundannahmen 
wird ein Modell des demokratischen Prozesses entwickelt. Dieses enthalt u.a. 
eine Abgrenzung von drei Subsystemen des politischen Systems und eine 
Bestimmung der relevanten kollektiven Akteure dieser drei Subsysteme. Zur 
theoretischen Vorbereitung der empirischen Erklarung unterschiedlicher Pro-
zefiphanomene durch unterschiedliche strukturelle Arrangements liberaler 
Demokratien wird zudem ein Konzept politischer Strukturen und politischer 
Performanz vorgeschlagen. 1 
1. The Context of Inquiry
1 
The general field of inquiry at the Berlin Science Center 'Institutions and Social 
Change' Research Unit is the ability of political institutions in modern societies 
appropriately to register and process the problems generated by the changes 
these societies experience. A large number of theoretical diagnoses have 
questioned this ability. To the extent that such doubt is empirically tenable, the 
question arises as to the functional equivalence of individual institutions or 
institutional arrangements that prove better able to solve problems. Our first 
step will be to elucidate the concrete and topical significance of this general 
issues by dealing briefly with the most important diagnoses to date. Against 
this background, we will then seek to demonstrate that a metatheory of the 
democratic process is required as a precondition for analysing the issue raised 
by these theoretical diagnoses. The envisaged metatheory is thus a prerequisite 
for such analysis, not the analysis itself. 
Since about the mid-seventies, theoretical diagnosis has been dominated by the 
hypothesis that political decision-making processes are subject to structurally 
determined closure towards on-going modernization demands put forward by 
citizens
2. Such demands were understood - at least in empirical social research -
to be especially those arising within the framework of the development of 
postmaterialist value orientations (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Closure towards new 
demands was attributed to two structural factors evidencing differing degrees 
of consolidation. In the first place, it was attributed to the inertia of party 
1 I would like to express my gratitude for the constructive criticism and useful hints given oh a 
first version of this paper by my colleagues in the WZB 'Social Change, Institutions and 
Intermediation Processes' research unit and to Klaus von Beyme who was guest professor 
here in 1992/93. My thanks are also due to Rhodes Barrett for translating the German text 
into English. 
2 A comparable discussion had taken place in the seventies, but from a completely different 
theoretical perspective. The point of reference of the hypothesis of a structurally determined 
closure of the political system towards demands made by society was in this case not so 
much specific interests as interests of specific social groups. See inter alios Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962,1963) and Offe (1969). 2 
systems that have evolved in the course of history, systems that came into being 
on the basis of quite different interests (materialist group interests), and in the 
second place to the logic of competition between parties in representative 
democracies as such. The orientation of competing parties towards maximising 
their share of the vote implies an orientation towards voter majorities. This in 
its turn implies a structural tendency to closure vis a vis minority interests. This 
constitutes closure towards new demands only to the extent that new demands 
are also minority demands. It has now become almost commonplace in 
academic argument to regard the increasing use of non-institutionalized forms 
of action and the formation of new social movements as a consequence of this 
stmcturaUy-deterrrtined closure vis a vis new demands. 
The perspective shifted to become somewhat more radical in about the mid-
eighties. Authors like Offe (1985) and Beck (1986) take as their point of 
departure the fact that the use of non-institutionalized forms of action and the 
consolidation of the new social movements as collective actors on the political 
scene have become durable and important factors in the political process
3. As 
far as the democratic process is concerned, this means that the political decision 
makers are permanently confronted by a new type of demand
4 (postmaterialist 
or life-world demands) that attempt to exercise direct influence not mediated 
by the political parties. Beck (1986) describes this development as the 
perception and assertion of democratic action spaces within the system of rules 
governing representative democracy. In practical terms, however, this involves 
undermining the traditional function of the party system proposed by the 
model of liberal democracy, which is to filter (and thus limit) demands made on 
political decision makers and to disburden the decision-making process from 
the constraints of having to establish legitimacy. Offe and Beck therefore 
3 As far as the collectivity of citizens is concerned, this assumption is empirically confirmed by 
the results of representative population surveys in a number of western European countries. 
The acceptance of new social movements and the noninstitutionalized forms of action used 
by them is very marked in these countries, and is tending to increase (Fuchs 1991, Fuchs and 
Ruchtl993). 
4 What Inglehart calls postmaterialist demands are referred to in other theoretical contexts as 
life-world demands (see Habermas 1981; Offe 1985; Raschke 1985). The two concepts are not 
identical in meaning, but do overlap to a considerable extent. 3 
diagnose the erasure of boundaries in the political system. Even if the party 
systems still leaned towards closure, the perception and assertion of democratic 
action spaces would have generally opened the political decision-making 
system to societal demands, a process that becomes a problem in its turn. We 
can describe this problem as the ousting of politics or as a loss in the capacity to 
make decisions and shape events brought about by the obliteration of 
boundaries. 
The Offe and Beck's arguments introduced aspects that have been taken up and 
intensified in the current discussion on postmodernization. Offe and, in parti-
cular, Beck take as their point of departure the disintegration of the social 
structure of modern industrial society, regarding the individualization of life 
situations as the consequence of this development (see also Zapf 1987). This 
individualization is one of the causes of the erasure of boundaries in politics, 
since it is one of the factors contributing to the articulation of new and more 
demands on politics. However, since this multitude of demands has a common 
material core, which can be more precisely defined in terms of the concept of 
postmaterialism or the life-world paradigm, it relates to a limited loss of 
boundaries in the political system that can be comprehended as an expression 
of differentiation. This type of differentiation certainly does not enhance either 
the decision-making ability of the political system nor its aggregational 
capacity, but it does not necessarily lead to paralysis. If demands are both 
specific in content and stable, it is possible to take them into permanent 
account. It is a different matter when demands are fragmented, as is claimed 
especially within the framework of the postmodernization discussion (see 
Gibbins 1989; Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992; Fuchs and Klingemann 1993). 
The progressive dissolution of durable patterns of political orientation is seen to 
be superseded either by a multitude of individual demands obeying the logic of 
the mass-media in agenda-setting, or by transient demand packages 
representing rather amorphous amalgams of a wide variety of ideological 
elements. Even if we dismiss this as theoretical exaggeration, it does broadly 
coincide with current interpretations of particularistic and anomic tendencies in 4 
Western societies advanced especially by journalists and politicians (e.g., 
Kleinert 1992). 
If we accept the premise of the particularization or fragmentation of citizens' 
demands (and there is something to be said for it), what would this mean for 
the capacity of the political system to act and to shape events? The most 
efficient and the legitimate point of reference on which the collective actors in 
the political system (parties, government) can orient their activities in the 
interest of acquiring and sustaining power is the orientation towards majorities 
among the population. This majority rule is not an effective mechanism for 
establishing a capacity to act and organize if majorities are in a state of constant 
flux and if existing minorities show little inclination to accept the decisions 
taken on the basis of orientation towards majorities. These two factors imply 
that the very openness of the decision maker towards the citizen limits his 
capacity to make decisions. The well-known problem in democratic theory of 
the precarious relationship between the responsiveness and effectiveness of the 
political system would then once again be on the agenda in a relatively drastic 
form. An overall paradoxical situation could develop. The fragmentation of 
citizens' interests and demands is only a symptom of a more fundamental 
societal process of disintegration. This intra-societal development has been 
compounded by the elimination of the East-West conflict as an integrating 
mechanism operating on Western societies from without. Such disintegration 
generates uncertainty among citizens, entailing the expectation that politics will 
reduce uncertainty by taking decisive action (see also Kleinert 1992). The 
paradox is that the fragmented citizen can himself be regarded as one of the 
causes of the reduction in the capacity of political system agents to act. It is 
argued that there is a discrepancy between the citizens' general expectation that 
action should be taken and their widely differing ideas about where and how this 
should be done. Current criticism of the 'political caste' glosses over this 
inconsistency. It constructs the fiction of a collectivity of the citizens, whose 
interest are no longer addressed by the 'political caste'. 
This desire for more effective politics is also the point of departure for current 
diagnoses by politicians themselves. Biedenkopf (1989) and especially 5 
Weizacker (Hofmann and Perger 1992) are the most prominent contributors. 
Their criticism is sparked off primarily by the neglect of long-term societal 
interests in favour of the short-term interests of the citizen. Various forms of 
environmental destruction are cited as examples of such neglect, problems that 
Inglehart assigns to the domain of postmaterialist orientations. Their response 
to the problem of the relatively high degree of responsiveness to actual current 
demands and the relatively low degree of responsiveness to potential future 
demands is basically only a moralizing one, branding the responsiveness of the 
political system towards the specific current demands of the citizen as survey 
democracy (alternative but essentially comparable terms in use are "mood 
democracy' 'media democracy' or 'populist adjustment"). But the question is one 
that democratic theory has difficulty in answering, namely how citizens' long-
term interests are to be asserted and implemented if necessary even against their 
short-term interests (i.e., against their current interests). Moreover, it would be 
necessary to offer institutional alternatives to competitive party system 
mechanisms that make it possible in the first place systematically to take such 
long-term interests into account from a structural point of view. 
At this point let us summarize and generalize the outlined theoretical diagnoses 
from the point of view of structurally determined closure towards societal 
demands. The hypothesis of structurally determined closure presents three 
dimensions: 
1. In the material dimension it refers to the systematic exclusion of certain 
types of interest (e.g., postmaterialist interests). 
2. In the social dimension it refers to the systematic exclusion of the interests 
of certain social groups (e.g., socially weaker groups). 
3. In the time dimension it refers to the systematic exclusion of future 
interests as opposed to present ones (e.g. environmental issues). 
In so far as such systematic exclusion occurs, one can speak of deficiencies in 
the democratic process. If such systematic exclusion is attributable to political 
system structures, then from the democratic theory perspective we must ask 
what concrete structures entail what exclusion effects in the democratic process 
- a question that must be answered empirically. The envisaged metatheory of 6 
the democratic process is intended to contribute to the theoretical preconditions 
for such empirical analysis. 
In outlining the theoretical diagnoses, we have touched on a problem that we 
must now raise to a more abstract conceptual level. If we assume that citizens' 
demands are either differentiated or fragmented, the result is a greater variety 
and a greater variability of demands. The actors of the political decision-making 
system find it correspondingly more difficult to identify the demands that 
really represent the 'will' of the citizen at any given moment (in the electoral 
campaign phase) and in the medium term (in relation to the whole legislative 
period). The same general causes for this development among citizens results in 
an increase in instriimental rationality among the actors in the political 
decision-making system (especially among the political parties) that primarily 
obeys the functional logic of the political system (occupation of decision-
making positions by winning elections)
5. In the context of this rationality, 
political goals take on the character of means to this end i.e., they are primarily 
formulated in opportunistic adjustment to the presumed demands of the voter. 
For the voter this brings uncertainty about what the political parties really want 
and what they will in fact do. The problem of double contingency (Parsons 1951, 
1968) thus arises in the relationship between citizens and political parties i.e., 
each of the two actors makes his conduct contingent on the conduct of the 
other, which in both cases is extremely unpredictable. Luhmann (1984, 152) 
provides a succinct definition of contingency: 'A thing is contingent if it is 
neither necessary nor impossible'. If the interacting agents are to act 
contingently
6, the question is how democratic processes are to be described 
under this condition and how the political structures would have to be 
constituted if they are to be in a position to absorb as much contingency as 
5 Within the framework of systems theory oriented modernization theories, the general causes 
are seen as being the progressive secularisation of culture and the differentiation of structure 
(Almond and Powell 1978; Willke 1992). More concrete forms in which these processes 
manifest themselves are discussed in Beck (1986), Zapf (1987), and Crook, Pakulski and 
Waters (1992). 
6 Each of the actors could act differently and is aware that the other could do likewise, and 
each knows that the other is also aware of this (Luhmann 1984,165). 7 
possible. In the face of the contingency problem, Willke (1992, 36) concludes 
that for theoretical purposes it is imperative to include the 'role of contingency 
in the operational mode of complex social systems' in any theory of the political 
system in modern societies. Willke regards this as being particularly ineluctable 
for societies that, in postindustrialism or postmodernization theories for 
example, have attained a level of modernity that generates 'an unusual degree 
of contingency' (Luhmann 1992, 93). In our metatheory of the democratic 
process we will be constantly returning to this contingency problem to ensure 
that it is taken into account even at the model level in our theory of the 
democratic process. It is assumed on the one hand that contingency is a 
fundamental problem for the political structures of all modern societies, and on 
the other that structural variation vitally influences the capacity to absorb 
contingency. 
This brief outline of theoretical diagnoses has been intended to indicate the 
scope of the general issue of the capacity of the political institutions in modern 
societies to deal with problems. The institutional arrangements in these 
societies can be described at an abstract level as those of liberal democracy 
(Barber 1984, Held 1987). This is an alternative term to representative democracy, 
which contains reference to a central structural aspect of the political 
arrangements. For this reason, critical diagnoses are generally formulated as 
diagnoses of deficiencies in the democratic process controlled by the structures 
of this type of democracy (liberal or representative democracy). Phenomena 
such as the increasing proportion of non-voters, the growing dissatisfaction 
with the established political parties, the rise of new right-wing and regional 
parties, increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic process as a whole, the 
growth of political protest etc., are often cited as manifestations of this 
deficiency. The trouble with such evidence is that it is used almost entirely to 
illustrate a theoretical hypothesis, and also that it is cited selectively. However, 
comparative studies show that these phenomena affect only some Western 
countries, and do so to a widely differing degree (Klingemann and Fuchs). Even 
if one assumes that these phenomena are manifestations of a deficiency in the 
democratic process (which is to some extent open to question), these empirical 8 
discrepancies show that the degree of deficiency varies greatly among the 
Western countries. This circumstance points to the importance of drawing 
distinctions within the general category of liberal democracy. We will be 
dealing with this aspect at a later stage. 
The general issue of the ability of political institutions to process and perceive 
problems due to societal change can, on the basis of the theoretical diagnoses 
discussed above, be formulated in three concrete questions: 
1. On the degree of the systematic exclusion of interests (differentiated into 
the material, social, and time dimensions), 
2. On the capacity for the absorption of contingency: 
3. On the type and gravity of the consequences of points 1 and 2 for the 
attitudes and conduct of the citizens
7. 
Further concrete questions could certainly be formulated, but we can assume 
that these three are the most important ones in the current discussion on the 
quality of the democratic process in liberal democracies. The empirical analysis 
of such questions presupposes the empirical reconstruction of the democratic 
process. This involves two types of description. If we may anticipate our 
argument with the general premise that the democratic process is an orderly 
sequence of clearly distinct phases determined by the structures of the political 
system, the first task is empirically to describe the individual phases as such, 
and the second to ascertain the relations between these phases. The first type of 
description includes, for example, empirically ascertaining the concrete 
demands addressed by the citizen to the political system, or empirically 
recording the concrete decisions reached by the political system. The second 
type of description has been provided paradigmatically by a research project 
that examines the extent to which political party platforms predict 
governmental action in ten Western countries (Klingemann, Hofferbert and 
Budge). Other sections of the process could and should be analysed in the same 
7 To posit this as an additional question is naturally only meaningful if we assume that the 
relation between 1 and 2 on the one hand and 3 on the other is non-deterministic. 9 
manner to discover, for example, the extent to which party platforms are 
determined by public demand. 
Once the democratic process has been described and reconstructed, the 
question of explaining the empirically recorded variations in individual 
countries can be investigated. There is an long-standing controversy in the 
social sciences on what factors are to be regarded in the final instance as being 
relevant in causing political phenomena. Are they to be attributed to societal 
factors or rather to factors endogenous to the political system itself (see Sartori 
1969; Easton 1990)? We agree with Sartori and Easton that factors endogenous 
to the political system exert an independent influence on political phenomena. 
Within our present context this means explaining empirical variations at the 
process level by means of empirical variations at the structural level. One 
example for such an explanatory strategy is to attribute differences in the 
transformation of voter demands into governmental action in different 
democracies to differences in the structures of the party systems in these 
democracies. Such analyses can be carried out only if the relevant data for a 
number of countries are available, which must furthermore be so similar that a 
comparative analysis is meaningful in the first place. These two criteria are met 
in the case of the OECD countries. The OECD was founded in 1961, and since 
1973 has had 24 full members. One consequence of membership of relevance for 
our research purposes is that numerous economic and political macrodata are 
available on all member countries. Moreover, the countries in question share 
two characteristics 'that clearly identify them as belonging to one category of 
country. They have capitalist and relatively developed economies (with a 
consequent relatively high standard of living), and their political systems are 
liberal-pluralist or competitive' (Nohlen 1983, 13). Within the context of our 
inquiry this means that the search for functional equivalence between political 
structures is limited to functional equivalence within the system of liberal or 
representative democracy. We would not go as far as Fukuyama (1992), who 
claims that the collapse of the socialist countries also implies the end of history. 
But it is true that this collapse also means the end of an existing and thus in 
principle realizable alternative to representative democracy. A narrowing down 10 
of the perspective to functional equivalence within representative democracies 
and not to representative democracies is thus initially justified. Evert such 
critical analyses as those of Rodel, Frankenberg and Dubiel (1989) take the 
liberal democracies in their own fashion as their point of departure in that, 
while putting the democratic question, they nevertheless take representative 
democracy as the institutional framework within which this question can 
meaningfully be put. Precisely because of the collapse of the socialist regimes it 
is no longer possible to legitimize all forms of liberal democracy with reference 
to the worse alternative system. The perspective shifts to a comparison of 
differing structural arrangements of liberal democracies as a general category of 
political system. 
Indicating the context to which the metatheory of the democratic process is to 
relate says nothing about the nature and the status of this metatheory itself. The 
empirical reconstruction of the democratic process in the OECD countries and 
the explanation of empirically recorded differences at the process level requires 
such a metatheory. The metatheory is thus merely one (not the only) theoretical 
precondition for such empirical analysis. It has two fundamental components. 
First a model of the democratic process* that is valid for all OECD countries and 
permits the empirical reconstruction of the processes in individual countries in 
the first place. Second, a concept of political structures on the basis of which 
concrete structures can be determined empirically. Restricting the purview of 
the envisaged metatheory with its two components to the OECD countries, that 
is to say to liberal democracies, limits its scope. It is thus to be distinguished 
from the universal metatheories of the political process such as that of Easton 
(1965). 
8 To speak of a democratic process is naturally only meaningful in relation to this general 
model. At the empirical level a number of democratic processes is likely to be identifiable, 
which in their turn have common and differing structural features. 11 
2. The Concept of Metatheory and Metatheoretical 
Presuppositions 
In a recent volume, Ritzer (1992, 7) refers to an explosion of interest in sociologi-
cal metatheory over the past few years. Ritzer defines metatheory (1992, 7) in 
general as 'the systematic study of the underlying structure of sociological 
theory
1. This can mean many things, as the contributions to Ritzer's volume 
show. Our concern is the manner in which Lehmann (1988) introduced 
metatheory into political science for the purpose of developing a model of the 
polity (we do not refer to the model itself). Lehmann takes Alexander's (1982) 
'scientific continuum and its components' as his point of departure. The basic 
idea is that empirical facts can be generated and then interpreted only if one has 
a frame of reference, which can be labelled 'meta-theory'. The 'meta' concept is 
appropriate, since theories in the sense of Popper consist of hypotheses in the 
form of if...then conjectural statements that can be tested empirically. However, 
Alexander believes that the specification of such hypotheses depends on 
prerequisites not amenable to empirical testing, or only to a limited degree. 
These prerequisites implicitly accompany all empirical research, and must be 
made explicit if the implications of the scientific undertaking are to be assessed. 
Alexander (1982, 3) proposes, as a sort of meta-metatheory, his continuum 
running between the two poles of the 'metaphysical environment' and the 
'empirical environment' of scientific inquiry (see Figure 1). 
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Source: Alexander (1982, S.3) 12 
Alexander's conceptualization of scientific inquiry as a continuum
9 between 
these two poles has certain advantages over and beyond its intellectual 
elegance. First the polar opposition of theory and empirical investigation is 
breached, and second the significance and salience of the individual 
components of the continuum are elucidated by being placed in one dimension 
and thus becoming mutually explicable. At this stage, however, we will not 
examine the whole continuum but will concentrate on the components that can 
clearly be considered metatheory, namely 'presuppositions' and 'models' 
(Lehmann 1988, 809). The metatheory of the democratic process refers 
principally to these two components, although at certain points there is a shift 
to components closer to the 'empirical environment', such as 'complex and 
simple propositions' and 'observations'. As the term 'general presuppositions' 
indicates, they relate to general and unavoidable basic choices that control 
further theory formation. Models, by contrast, consist of 'a logically ordered set 
of concepts that highlights the key features of the subject matter of a scientific 
discipline' (Lehmann 1988, 809). This brief definition of the two metatheoretical 
components clearly indicates that metatheory as understood by Alexander and 
Lehmann is neither theory of theory nor a general reflection on theory 
formation (on the later aspect see Coleman 1990, 1-23). The 'meta' element 
merely indicates that it goes beyond theory in Popper's sense, which would 
have to be assigned to 'laws' on Alexander's continuum.
1
0 
Having elucidated what we mean by metatheory, we can now seek to establish 
what criteria a good metatheory requires and how these are to be met for 
specific subject matters. Alexander proposes two fundamental criteria for an 
adequate metatheory, parsimony and multidimensionality (see also Lehmann 
1988, 409 et seq.). While the criterion of parsimony is a generally accepted 
theory formation criterion in the theory of science, the criterion of 
multidimensionality is not immediately evident, especially as it appears to be in 
9 It is not in fact a continuum but a sequence of clearly defined components between the two 
poles. 
10 In systems theory terms the proposed metatheory of the democratic process would be a 
general theory of the democratic process in liberal or representative democracies. 13 
contradiction to parsimony. In effect Alexander sees it as limiting the 
parsimony criterion. Although metatheory ought to be formulated as 
economically as possible, it must avoid biased a priori conjecture on empirical 
reality. This openness of simple presuppositions towards complex empirical 
reality can be described as (potential) multidimensionality. Alexander's 
criterion of multidimensionality also implies a bidirectional flow of inquiry, i.e., 
from the metaphysical pole of the continuum towards the empirical pole and 
vice versa. This means not only that empirical research is carried out on a 
metatheoretical basis, but that metatheoretical reflection is in its turn 
reformulated in the light of the results obtained by empirical research. A 
precondition for this permanent feedback process is that more concrete levels 
(more concrete in the sense of being closer to the 'empirical environment' pole) 
are seen as specifying more general concepts. Only then can systematic 
reference be made from the more concrete levels to the more general ones. 
Among other things, this implies that the metatheory should be elaborated 
from the outset with a view to being to some extent able stringently to control 
empirical research, or as Lehmann (1988, 810) puts it, 'Metatheory then consists 
of presuppositions and models. It constitutes a framework that permits the 
formulation and testing of "decisive" hypotheses. Presuppositions and models 
are more scientific when they successfully balance the needs of parsimony and 
multidimensionality.' 
According to Alexander (1982, 37), acceptable theoretical presuppositions must 
be not only general in nature but also decisive. Presuppositions are decisive 
when they are nontrivial with regard to significant scientific problems in the 
subject matter under investigation. In sociological research Alexander (1982,40) 
situates two fundamental issues at the presupposition level, that of action and 
that of order. We will attempt to address these two aspects in our context, and 
to render them somewhat more concrete. Alexander understands the term 
'action' fully in the axiomatic sociological sense of the most elementary form of 
social behaviour. His definition is akin to Parson's classical definition of action 
as the realization of intentions in situations, which in its turn is based on older 
classical definitions. We shall reformulate these definitions to a certain extent, 14 
describing action as the making (and implementing) of rational choices by 
actors (individual and collective) within the scope of situational and structural 
constraints. This definition of action culled from the rational choice paradigm 
(see March 1978, Elster 1986, Wiesenthal 1987) has the advantage on the one 
hand of being very simple, and on the other of being amenable to successful 
adaptation by scientific research in a variety of fields of action. It thus meets the 
criteria of parsimony and multidimensionality. One of the consequences of this 
multifarious adaptability is that progressive approximation to reality can be 
achieved without parsimony being lost. The originally very restrictive 
economics concept of rational choice was unable to do this. Our definition thus 
satisfies the criteria of parsimony and multidimensionality. The restrictiveness 
of classical economics rational choice theory relates primarily to the 
assumptions that actors are subject to no cognitive and informational limits in 
their rational calculation of options, and that this rational calculation is 
controlled by the principle of utility optimization. Both assumptions have since 
been abandoned in a number of rational choice theories. It is now assumed that 
the search for and selection of options in attaining goals is made on a limited 
and uncertain informational basis, and that an option is chosen that has an 
acceptable utility for the actor ('satisficing') and not necessarily optimum utility 
('optimizing')
11. This development had already been addressed by Downs 
(1957) and Simons (1957), who discussed the problems of information 
uncertainty and information costs as well as 'bounded rationality'. 
Even if more recent rational choice theories are relatively more reality-centred, 
the question remains why rational choice is to be used in action theory in the 
first place
12. Only a relative answer is possible. Rational choice theory has the 
relatively greatest potential among the options available. A deductive procedure 
11 On the current discussion on a more 'realistic' rationality concept, see March (1978), Simon 
(1985), Elster (1986), Wiesenthal (1987), Monroe (1991), Coleman and Fararo (1992). On the 
rationality concept in the field of political action see Fiorina (1981), Bennett and Salisbury 
(1987), March and Olsen (1983, 1989) Tsebelis (1990), Popkin (1991), Fuchs and Kiihnel 
(1993). 
12 This question is also raised by the objections which persist even if a higher degree of reality-
centredness is taken into account. See the contributions in the collections by Monroe (1991) 
and Coleman and Fararo (1992). 15 
would mean taking general assumptions about the activities of actors as one's 
starting point, and, in connection with additional assumptions concerning the 
field in which action is taken, formulating precise prognoses on actors' actual 
behaviour. These can then be tested empirically. Such potential can, for 
example, scarcely be postulated for social psychology action theories. As a rule, 
the latter depend on ex post facto explanation of actual action, since this is 
psychologically overdetermined (Bennett and Salisbury 1987, 5 et seq.). 
However, the extent to which the potentiality of a deductive explanatory 
strategy exists in the face of a concept of rationality less restrictive than that 
provided by classical rational choice theory is an issue still to be settled both 
theoretically and empirically. In view of the alternatives (such as social 
psychology action theories, or theories of symbolic interactionism), we 
nevertheless assume that it is only rational choice theory that provides the 
opportunity to generalize hypotheses and specify empirically fertile prognoses. 
This is particularly true if the relevant actors are also, or primarily, collective 
actors, as is the case in the metatheory of the democratic process. For example, 
psychological explanations for action are not very plausible in the case of 
collective actors. Moreover, the fundamental rational choice theory distinction 
between 'choices' and 'constraints' provides a systematic link to systems theory. 
This is necessary if the nature of 'constraints' is to be explicated more precisely 
than is possible within the framework of rational choice theory. 
This brings us to the second problem that, according to Alexander, the pre-
suppositions of all sociological investigation should take into account, the 
problem of order. We feel that this question cannot be raised and answered at 
the action level alone. Although it is addressed in the rational choice paradigm 
by the concept of 'constraints', what constitutes 'constraints' in any given 
instance cannot adequately be determined at the action level. In the following 
chapters we shall be returning to the question of what we mean by constraints 
and to the relationship between constraints and choices. But first let us 
summarize what we have dealt with so far. The subject matter of our inquiry is 
the democratic process. In our definition of action we have established a 
presupposition that anticipates another with respect to our subject. The 16 
democratic process is understood as interaction among agents acting rationally 
within the bounds of structural constraints in order to realize their intentions. 
Our metatheory will analyse the democratic process and related structural 
constraints with reference to systems theory categories. On the basis of the 
presuppositions discussed we will be attempting to outline various elements of 
a metatheory of the democratic political process. This will primarily take the 
form of a systems theory model of this process and the development of a 
structure concept permitting a more precise definition of the constraints on the 
actions of the actors who carry this democratic political process. Since the 
envisaged metatheory is to provide as systematic a linkage between action 
theory and systems theory as possible, we shall begin with an at least summary 
account of the current confrontation of the two paradigms. Further 
metatheoretical presuppositions will be introduced within the framework of 
this discussion. 17 
3. Systems Theory and Action Theory 
The controversy between the two major paradigms of social scientific theory 
formation, between systems theory and action theory (or actor theory) seems to 
come in waves, each paradigm in turn gaining the upper hand (Schimank 1988, 
619). We begin with a brief account of criticism levelled at the two paradigms. 
Our point of reference for systems theory is functionalist systems theory, our 
point of reference for action theory being the rational choice theory we have 
already discussed. Our guiding perspective is the assumption that a metatheory 
of the democratic process must take both paradigms into account. The criticism 
of systems theory relevant in this perspective comes under the heading 'lack of 
actor reference' (Schimank 1985), while relevant criticism of action theory can, 
to vary Schimank's term, be entitled 'lack of system reference'. 
Functionalist systems theory, the most celebrated version of which has been 
provided by Parsons, takes the functional requirements for sustaining a social 
system as its point of departure in theory formation. Social interactions are 
analysed from the point of view of these functions. Older criticism of 
functionalist systems theory objected that functional requirements were neither 
a priori, nor scientifically observable (Nagel 1956, Hempel 1959; see also 
Wiswede/Kutsch 1978). These authors together with Giddens at a later date 
(1976) consequently banned functional requirements to the realm of 
metaphysics and excluded them from the social-scientific discourse. If one 
remains within the framework of the empirically-oriented concept of science 
that-underlies this conclusion, a proposal by Mayntz (1988) could permit the 
function concept to be retained while at the same time making it amenable to 
empirical inquiry. She suggests defining the function concept without having 
recourse to a priori and/or universal functional requirements. Drawing a 
functional distinction between a subsystem and the overall societal context of 
action can succeed only if both the actors within this subsystem and its relevant 
environment perceive and recognize the functional specificity of the subsystem. 
This function concept is directly compatible with Alexander's 'scientific 
continuum'. As a concept it belongs to metatheory, but it is formulated in such a 18 
way that it can guide empirical inquiry and be modified in its concrete content 
by the outcomes of empirical research. 
More recent criticism of the lack of actor-reference has been put forward by 
numerous researchers, including of course the adherents of the action theory 
paradigm. However, we will concern ourselves especially with authors who 
either acknowledge their adherence to the systems theory paradigm or make 
use of aspects of it in their own work (Mouzelis 1974, Rueschemeyer 1977, 
Crozier and Friedberg 1990, Schimank 1985, 1988, Mayntz 1988a, Easton 1990). 
Immanent criticism of a theoretical paradigm frequently contributes more to its 
further development than criticism from the perspective of alternative 
paradigms. 
Criticism of the lack of actor-reference in systems theory unfolds on two suc-
cessive levels. The first of these is that of the theory's explanatory deficiency. 
With regard to Parson's statements on social differentiation, Schimank (1985, 
425), for example, objects that one is always asking 'why does that happen?'. 
When explaining evolutionary processes, Parsons (1971) has recourse to such 
highly abstract mechanisms as inclusion, value generalization, differentiation 
and adaptive upgrading. But the explanatory nature of these mechanisms 
remains unclear. They seem to be part of the phenomenon rather than an 
explanation of it. The second level of criticism addresses the relevance of actors 
when they occur within the framework of systems theory analyses. Mouzelis 
(1974, 426 et seq.) complains, for example, that Smelser (1959) mentions 
collective actors but attributes no independent significance to them (i.e., they do 
not truly act) because their actions are fully determined by the system and are 
thus mere products of it. Schimank (1985, 427) follows up this criticism and 
introduces the distinction between social systems that determine action and such 
that are capable of action. The latter appear to be largely synonymous with 
collective actors given the status of subsystems within more comprehensive 
systems. We feel that it is only from this point of view that Schimank's 
distinction becomes plausible. 19 
Crozier and Friedberg (1980) have devoted a monograph to this problem of 
actors and systems. Their starting point is a certain concept of the relationship 
between systems and actors. On this basis they elaborate a theory of collective 
action in organizations as a specific form of social system. We do not intend to 
go into the theory in greater detail at this point, since it sets off in a direction 
different from the one we are taking. What is interesting for our purposes, 
however, is the definition of the relations between systems and actors. 
According to Crozier and Friedberg (1980, 45), the idea of action being 
determined by systems is inappropriate. 'A given organizational situation never 
completely constrains an actor. He always retains a margin of liberty and 
negotiation.
1 In pursuing his own strategies, every actor attempts to retain this 
margin and to extend it, if only because it permits him better to implement his 
strategies. However, extending the margin of liberty means reducing 
dependence on others. Since all actors attempt to obtain more leeway, the 
question arises whether the system - or in the case of Crozier and Friedberg the 
organization - can survive. Crozier and Friedberg (1990, 52) seek to solve this 
problem by attributing to rationally acting agents an interest in sustaining the 
conditions that must prevail if interrelated interactions are to occur at all. These 
conditions consist of a more or less extensive set of 'rules of the game' that have 
to be accepted by the interacting agents, thus limiting their choices while not 
completely detenrdning them. Taking a completely different systems theory 
approach, Easton (1965) comes to a comparable conclusion. He sees the 
condition for a functioning political process as being the existence of a sufficient 
degree of generalized support for the regime, which he also sees as being 
defined by, among other things, the 'rules of the game'. 
In his latest theoretical study, Easton deals explicitly with the relationship 
between actors and system, and, as in rational choice theory, defines this 
relationship in terms of constraints and choices: '...a constraint is a limit on the 
variety of choices open to an individual or collectivity. It is a condition that 
reduces choices from infinity to some finite number. The smaller the number of 
choices the greater the constraint' (Easton 1990, 25). Thus Easton also takes up 
the idea that the action of individual and collective actors is constrained by 20 
systems, and that, despite these constraints, their action is not determined but 
that they are offered choices. In discussing the systemic constraints on actors, 
Easton makes a simple but far-reaching specification. It is not so much the 
systems themselves that limit the action of individuals and collectivities as the 
structures of these systems (Easton 1990, 55). It is only this specification that 
allows us theoretically to explain and empirically to demonstrate how 
constraints systematically affect the action of actors. For this reason a discussion 
of a structure concept must be included in the envisaged metatheory. 
If action is influenced and controlled in the manner described by systemic 
structures notwithstanding the existence of more or less extensive "zones of 
freedom' for rationally acting agents in the sense of Crozier and Friedberg and 
of Easton, action always reproduces a structure, provided that the choices open 
to this action remain within the scope of the given structures. But it can lead to 
these structures being modified, first by conscious nonacceptance of the rules of 
the game (which means that choices are extended to structures), and second by 
the unintentional cumulative effects of action that basically occurs within the 
given structures (e.g., due to contradictions in structural terms of reference). In 
this sense action is also structuring (Giddens 1984). In contrast to older 
'actorless' systems theory, such a concept of the relation between systems and 
actors permits analyses of how stabilization and change comes about in given 
systems without the necessity of having recourse to opaque self-regulatory 
mechanisms. 
Systems theory can justifiably be accused of a 'lack of actor-reference'. 
Complementary criticism of action theory (in the form of rational choice theory) 
has claimed to discern a 'lack of system-reference'. Action theoreticians 
themselves formulate this criticism, albeit in different terms. Heiner (1983,1985) 
argues that actors can act rationally only if there is a limited range of options. 
Only within such limits can a comparison from certain points of view be 
effected. Wiesenthal (1987, 435) points to another aspect of rational action. If 
rational action is primarily oriented towards the outcomes of actions, it 
presupposes that such outcomes can be expected with a minimum of 
probability. The precondition of rational action is accordingly the existence of 21 
constraints. For this reason, concrete constraints cannot be treated as extraneous 
to theory when it comes to explaining and prognosticating the actions of agents 
as is done in rational choice theory. March and Olsen (1983,1989) and Shepsle 
(1989) have come to similar conclusions
13. The necessity of systematically 
including constraints in explanatory strategy is demonstrated by two 
exemplary analyses carried out within the framework of the rational choice 
paradigm, the classical analysis by Downs (1957) and a recent one by Strom 
(1990) . It is only because these analyses provide precise explication of constraints 
that they prove convincing. They implicitly compensate the lack of system-
reference with the introduction of systemic constraints, introduced, however, 
without systematic theoretical endeavour of their own. 
The meaning of a 'lack of system-reference' has been addressed in greater detail 
by Munch (1983) and Schimank (1985, 1988). Munch shows once again that, 
from the outset, the action theory approach is (because of its own premises) 
directed towards situations that offer actors various and limited options. This 
tacitly presupposes what has been described as the precondition for rational 
action, which Munch (1983, 52) defines as stable common rules and norms of 
behaviour. Schimank (1988, 622) uses the term 'suprasituational, generalized 
action orientations'. These generalized action orientations in particular constitute 
social systems, imposing constraints on actors' activities in two ways. The first 
issue is the system in which action occurs in the first place. This already 
circumscribes the space for possible actions and excludes others. If, for example, 
an actor wishes to attain goals in the economic system, he must act 
economically and not, for example, culturally or politically
14. Once it has been 
settled in which system the action is taking place, the question of options for 
action within this system must be dealt with. These options are defined by the 
structures of the social system concerned and by its subsystems. We are thus 
dealing with a generalized action orientation at a lower level of generalization 
13 For this reason these authors demand that institutions be included in the rational choice 
approach. However, we believe not only that this postulate ought to be implemented in the 
theoretical context, but that it also requires taking systems theory categories into account. 
14 If he does not select any economic action, he generates no resonance in the economic system. 
This means that he is unable to attain any goals in this system. 22 
than the one mentioned, above. Both action orientations can be described as 
generalized in so far as they apply for all actors and constitute the precondition 
for choice. Choice involves the actor concerned exercising his preference in 
selecting one of the given options. In this sense choice can be regarded as a 
specific action orientation
15. Action theory's lack of system-reference has thus to 
do with ignoring generalized action orientation in analysing specific action 
orientation. We will conclude this discussion with an abstract but nevertheless 
precise definition from Schimank (1985, 428): 'Action is constituted ... by the 
intentionality of social systems capable of action within the scope of the 
conditionality of social systems that determine action'. Social systems that 
determine action are societal subsystems such as the political system, whereas 
social systems capable of action are collective actors that act within the 
framework of this societal subsystem. 
15 If we understand the prime distinction in action theory, that between choices and 
constraints, as a distinction between specific and generalized action meaning, we move in 
the direction of defining systems as meaning systems as does Luhmann, for example. This 
provides at le.nst a possibility that action and systems theory can integrated more 
systematically th;in has hitherto been the case. 23 
4. A Model of the Democratic Process 
4.1 The Democratic Process as a Sequence of Action Products 
According to the metatheoretical frame of reference we have postulated, the 
precondition for the empirical reconstruction of the democratic process is the 
development of a model of this process valid for all variants of this type of 
democracy. The variants result from differences in the structural arrangement 
of the subsystems of liberal democracies in individual countries. On the 
empirical level these generate differing democratic processes. A model of this 
type is to be formulated to provide a simplified image of reality in its essential 
aspects (implicit in the concept of model), while also permitting theoretically 
significant and empirically testable hypotheses to be detailed. If we agree with 
Lehmann (1988, 809) that a model consists of a 'logically ordered set of 
concepts', the task is to show what concepts are to be used to describe the 
democratic process and what logic the arrangement of these concepts obeys. In 
elaborating this model our point of departure will be analyses that have been 
made within the systems theory framework. 
In systems theories, too, political processes are understood as a sequence of 
related acts with a certain meaning. By referring to the act as a political one, this 
meaning is merely labelled. Against the background of metatheoretical 
considerations advanced to date, the content of the concept 'political' cannot be 
determined only by theoretical definition of functional requirements in the 
context of societal reproduction, but also by recourse to the perception of the 
actor himself. A differentiated political system exists to the extent that the actor 
is in a position to distinguish it from its environment and within its boundaries 
(Luhmann 1970, 155; Mayntz 1988, 19). The actor's capacity to identify and 
delimit the political system is on the other hand determined by the degree of 
differentiation existing at the structural level. In this latter regard at least three 
analytical levels are discernible, with differing degrees of structural stability, 
building on one another in differentiating a functional system (see Mayntz 1988, 
20 et seq. and Stichweh 1988, 261). The lowest level of individual and 24 
situational acts is succeeded by the level at which special political functional 
roles develop, to be followed in its turn by the level ort which more complex 
social structures arise through role linkage (either in the form of informal 
networks of role-actors or in the form of formal organizations that combine the 
various roles in accordance with a superordinate action goal). If all three levels 
of system formation develop - and this is the case in the democracies we are 
looking at - then each level places constraints on what is possible in the way of 
events and actions at the level beneath. We will be dealing with this when we 
discuss the concept of structure in Chapter 5. At this point it is important to 
note that the degree of differentiation of a political system is determined by the 
complementary relation of the actor's perception and the system's structural 
consolidation. Luhmann (1970,155) refers to this complementary relation when 
he stresses that 'it is only at the role level that differentiation can be carried out 
clearly so that it is unequivocally recognizable whether or not a role (such as 
that of civil servant, member of Parliament, party secretary, voter, applicant) 
has been assigned to the political system'. The more clearly a functional system 
has been differentiated at the role level, the greater the ease with which actors 
are able to recognize the system in its boundaries and to assign certain actions 
to it. 
The political process has been defined as a sequence of interrelated actions. This 
immediately raises the question how this action complex is to be recognized as 
being political and how it is to be distinguished from nonpolitical action. With 
reference to concepts introduced in the previous chapter, we are thus dealing 
with a first definition of generalized action meaning in the political system. To 
determine the special nature of political action, we must return to the functional 
definition of the political system as formulated in practically all important 
systems theories. The function of the political system is to formulate collective 
goals and to implement them in the form of collectively binding decisions (see 
inter alios Easton 1965, Parsons 1969, Luhmann 1970, Almond and Powell 1978). 
The action complex described as political process refers to the realization of this 
function. In the theories mentioned, this functional definition of the political 
system was quasi objective. We assume that this definition also serves as a 25 
perception criterion when subjects identify actions as political. We feel that this 
is a plausible assumption if only because the political system is in fact 
differentiated at the role level
16. As a consequence of this differentiation, 
political action is above all role action, and every role involves a high degree of 
definiteness in action meaning. Central among the roles that make it relatively 
easy to identify actions as political are the ones that, when networked, 
constitute the collective actors 'government' and 'parliament'. The action of 
these collective agents shows clearly that we are dealing with collective binding 
decisions made and implemented with the option of using coercive state 
powers (see also Parsons 1969,206 et seq.). Mayntz argues similarly (1988, 22 et 
seq.), although she refers to the differentiation of social systems as such and not 
only with respect to the political system. She regards is as an essential 
differentiation criterion in a social system 'whether and to what extent there are 
actors who claim self-regulatory competence internally and authority to 
represent interests externally'. When this stage of differentiation has been 
attained, such social systems 'are generally perceived by the members of society 
themselves as autonomous systems, the definition of which poses no real 
problem'. 
The next question to be tackled at the action level is concerned with the 
differentiation of political actions within the scope of this action meaning. How 
can the sequence of acts or the political process be subdivided into distinct and 
theoretically meaningful stages? Let us begin by taking a look at answers 
offered by the systems theories already discussed. Almond and Powell (1978, 
1988) attempt such a subdivision by means of a sequence of second-order 
process functions
1
7 (second order with regard to the mentioned primary 
function of the political process). However, we prefer the distinctions proposed 
16 In the final instance, of course, it must be empirically established to what extent the citizen is 
aware of this criterion (however diffuse his knowledge might be), and to what extent he uses 
it in his cognition of environmental events. 
17 The process functions posited by Almond and Powell are interest articulation, interest 
aggregation, policy making, policy implementation, and policy adjudication. To these are to 
be added the so-called policy functions, which refer to the output of the process functions, 
and which are subdivided into extraction, regulation and distribution (Almond and Powell 
1988,9). 26 
by Easton, since we feel they segment the process continuum with greater 
precision and also permit systematic actor reference as required by our 
metatheoretical presuppositions. Easton (1965) specifies his process model in 
two ways. First as a simple, dynamic feedback model, distinguishing only 
between input, conversion, output and feedback, and second in terms of the 
content or the material of this process. In this respect Easton distinguishes four 
qualities: wants, demands, issues, and decisions, which at the same time 
indicate the sequence of stages in the political process. Easton (1965, 72) also 
refers to these qualities as products, thus implicitly referring to actors who 
generate these products. However, in the further treatment of the political 
process, which he calls 'a systems analysis of political life', these actors have no 
systematic relevance, since Easton's metatheory is universal i.e., intended to 
apply to all political systems. The categories of a metatheory of this scope are 
consequently invariant and can integrate variable factors such as specific types 
of collective actor only for illustrative purposes. For this reason, according to 
Easton himself (1990, ix), such a metatheory cannot provide a frame of reference 
for dealing with questions such as what determines the generation of individual 
products of the political system in concrete political systems, and how the 
transformation of this chain of products is to be understood in detail. The 
metatheory of the political process which interests us is far more limited in 
scope. It deals with the representative democracies of Western societies, on 
which a sufficient number of (systems theory) analyses have been carried out, 
on the basis of which Easton's process model can be differentiated and 
concretized. 
One of the advantages of this more restricted metatheory is the possibility of 
relating the various qualities of the political process to specific actors, and of 
understanding them as products of the activities of these actors. For this reason 
we refer below to the stages of the political process as action products. This 
brings a shift in emphasis. The political process is now determined less by a 
sequence of interrelated actions of specific actors than by a directed chain of 
products of the actions of these actors. This shift in emphasis makes it easier to 
measure the phases of the political process empirically, since products must 27 
materialize in some form or other. It also reflects the fact that political action 
always has to do with the production of certain performances that are passed 
on to the environment of the political system. And performances are products of 
the actors' actions. Figure 2 shows the directed chain of action products in 
detail. The arrow marks the direction of sequence and is also intended to 
indicate that each stage is influenced by the immediately preceding one. We 
will be coming back to this influence and to the deviations from the step-by-
step exercise of influence. Before we do so, we must explain what is meant by 
the individual action products. 
Figure 2: A Model of the Democratic Process 
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According to the fundamental democratic norm, the demands of the citizen are 
the starting point of the democratic process. However, in the process model 
these demands are preceded by interests. Our term 'interest' corresponds to 
what Easton calls 'wants'. But Easton (1965, 71 et seq.) uses the term 'wants' to 
refer to a variety of factors that influence demands. Our concept of 'interest', by 
contrast, is intended to introduce a narrower and more specific meaning. In 
various manuals the term interest is defined as an intention of utility of a 
person or a group that is to be realized, (see e.g., Fuchs et al. 1975, 312, Massing 
1985, 384; also von Aleman 1987, 29). We will take these definitions as our 
starting point, giving them a stronger action-theory twist. Interests can 
accordingly be understood as action goals of individual and collective actors 
that are of utility to these actors, and which these actors seek to realize within 
the scope of the situational and structural constraints of social systems. The 
concept of action products involves two distinct stages in the realization of 
interests by means of actions undertaken by actors. First the explicit articulation 
of interests as intentions for actions that require realization, and second the 
actual realization of these articulated interests
18. The two stages are the 
outcome of interactions between relevant actors of social systems, and to this 
extent they are determinable as action products. Interests can, for example, be 
read and measured in the stage of explicit articulation in the utterances made 
by representatives of collective actors or in programmatic documents issued by 
such actors. It is certainly more complicated to register interests in the case of 
individual actors. Whether the use of elaborated survey techniques could be an 
adequate recording method is a question to be gone into elsewhere. 
Interests seen in relation to the democratic process are actors' action goals that 
are potential, not yet manifest (politicized) demands. They must therefore be 
assigned to the environment of the political system. But for various reasons 
18 The explicit articulation of interests, especially in anticipation of their transformation into 
demands, is regarded as the first stage towards realization. Certain actors in the democratic 
process have no possibility of realizing their demands themselves. The citizens, for example, 
need specialized actors such as parties and government. As a result of the coupling of these 
actors' decision-making activities with the articulated demands of the citizens brought about 
by the electoral mechanism, the articulation of demands can already be regarded as intentio-
nal action in the sense of goal attainment. 29 
they are components of the model of a democratic process. First, it is a relevant 
from the point of view of normative democratic theory to ask whether there are 
certain interests that cannot systematically be transformed into demands, due, 
for example, to the existence of structurally determined exclusion mechanisms. 
Second, the outputs of the democratic process (implemented decisions) 
transmute into new demands not only directly, but frequently only via complex 
causal sequences that are responsible for generating new interests. These in turn 
constitute potential inputs to the democratic process. This latter aspect of 
feedback should not be excluded at least at the model level. 
With our definition of interests we have provided a shell for other action 
products in so far as they, too, are conceived as the outcome of rational action 
by actors. The difference lies above all in the high degree of determinateness 
arising from the logic of the democratic process itself. There are two criteria in 
particular which distinguish demands from interests. In the first place, they 
represent only a selection from the mass of interests, and in the second place 
they are politicized in the sense that they relate to the expectation (or the 
demand) that they will be taken into account by the collectively binding 
decision-making process, and that they will be implemented (see also Easton 
1965, 38 et seq.). 
In the chain of action products, demands are succeeded by issues. These are 
demands selected by the political parties for their attention. Easton (1965,128 et 
seq.) describes this as 'demand reduction' with the function of 'intrasystem gate 
keeping' to prevent 'demand overload'. Issues are elements of demands taken 
up by the political parties and turned into the subject matter of their 
competitions for votes. The qualitative difference between issues and demands 
lies in proposals put forward by the political parties for the realization of these 
demands i.e., in proposed solutions or policy alternatives (see also Easton 1965, 14 
et seq., and Almond and Powell 1988, 9). Party platforms make selections from 
among the mass of issues, establishing relationships between them in the sense 
of setting up preference hierarchies and scheduling their intentions to tackle the 
issues selected. Establishing relationships in this way can also be described as 
aggregation. Within the category of platforms, it is useful to draw a distinction 30 
between party platforms, election platforms and government programmes, each 
of which have their own time horizon and, within the democratic process are 
either 'closer' to the issues or to the decisions. 
The action product immediately preceding the decisions is the programme in 
the form of government programmes. The decisions taken in parliaments and in 
governments are selections from these government programmes that are 
necessary if only because not everything can be implemented immediately and 
exactly the way as formulated programmatically. The specific quality of 
decisions as action products lies on the one hand in the allocation of resources 
to policy alternatives, which are a fundamental condition for the realization of 
programmatic goals. On the other hand they lie in the binding effect of these 
decisions on the collectivity of citizens and on the actors from other societal 
function systems. If the primary function of political action is to bring about 
collectively binding decisions, then this action product constitutes the heart of 
the democratic process. 
The binding nature of such decisions affects the consequent action products in a 
variety of ways. Within the governmental system the decisions of the 
government have to be accepted by the administrative authorities as the 
premise for action. In producing the specific action products of the 
administration, referred to as implementations, the authorities have no option to 
follow up some decisions while neglecting others. And this means that no 
selection from among a number of options takes place. There is only qualitative 
transformation by specifying premises for a decision in the form of economic 
and legal rules of procedure. It is only this implemented decision that can be passed 




The final action product in the model of the democratic process is the acceptance 
of the implemented decision by the actors in the public system. In this case, too, 
the binding character of the implemented decisions gives no room for selection, 
since non-acceptance is - at least officially - not permitted. On the other hand it 
19 Almond and Powell (1978,15) describe these action products as 'implemented policies'. 31 
is both legal and legitimate to evaluate the implemented decisions differently 
and to bring the evaluation (acceptance) thereof to bear on the formulation of 
new and different demands at the input end of the democratic process. For the 
purposes of official power structures, deviations from this type of acceptance of 
binding decisions are regarded as disturbances that are dysfunctional in the 
democratic process. We will be returning to this problem at a later stage. 
The last of the action products shown in Figure 2 is the outcomes in the societal 
environment of the governmental system's decision-making actions. Although 
implemented decisions have a greater or lesser effect on the societal 
environment, the final result is produced only by interaction with impact 
factors generated by the innate functional logic of societal subsystems to which 
the implemented decisions relate. What is referred to as outcomes in the 
process model is largely identical with what Easton (1965, 351) and Almond 
and Powell 1978, 16, 32-357) also call 'outcomes' (a discussion on the outcome 
concept is to be found in Roller 1992,18-22). 
Having described the individual action products, we can now summarize and 
generalize. The democratic process is to be understood as a directed sequence 
of action products of specific actors. This sequence has two dimensions, the 
transmission of the selections made by actors and the transformation of these 
selections by the actors. The transmission of selections is primarily quantitative 
in nature, since it is a matter of reducing the options on offer at each preceding 
stage (although in the case of two action products no option is possible in 
transmitting selections, i.e., the selections made at the preceding stage have to 
be taken over without further choices). The transformation of selections, on the 
other hand, is qualitative in nature, because each succeeding action product is 
changed by the additional specification of its quality. In Figure 3 the concrete 
meanings of the individual action products are shown in the two dimensions 
mentioned. 32 
Figure 3: Schematic Representation of Action Products 
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We will now consider in somewhat more detail the control of the directed 
sequence of action products at a more general level. When we say general, we 
mean that it is a question of control applicable to all representative democracies. 
This control is explained by interpreting the democratic process as a power 
process. In doing so we are returning to considerations that had already been 
made when describing the action products, seen this time in a different 
perspective. 
The model of the democratic process shown in Figure 2 refers to the formal 
process. The process is formal in the sense that 'the dominant direction of 
communication is supported by the official power structure' (Luhmann 1970, 
165). The official power structure is defined by the constitution and will be 
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Chapter 5), which in a certain manner controls the course of the political 
process. Luhmann (1970, 162) defines power as 'the possibility of selecting by 
one's own decision an alternative for others ... Power always exists when a 
certain option is selected from range of options by decision, and this selection is 
adopted by others as the premise for decision-making' (Parsons [1969, 352-404] 
gives a similar definition of power). The right to select an alternative for others 
that the latter are then obliged to adopt as the premise for their actions is a 
binding provision in the constitutions of Western representative democracies at 
the crucial nodes in the democratic process. The formal democratic process as a 
power process takes the collectivity of citizens as its starting point. This 
collectivity is constituted by a multitude of roles, among which the role of voter 
is the decisive one in setting the flow of power in motion. The specification of 
the voter role by electoral law in representative democracies is something like 
the operationalization of popular power at the structural level. This structural 
component implemented by electoral law exercises a twofold effect in 
generating power. First the anticipation on the part of the political parties of the 
vote to be cast by the citizen. If the occupation of government positions can be 
assumed to be an interest guiding the actions of political parties (a question we 
will be coming back to), it is also rational for competing parties to take the 
demands of the citizens into account in their electoral platforms. To this extent 
the claims of the citizen are the premises for the action of political parties, and 
to this extent also a power-controlled transmission of selections takes place. The 
power-generating effect of electoral law is also produced by the exercise of the 
franchise on the part of the citizen. The effect of this performance is that one or a 
number of parties are chosen to form the government, and thus the party 
platforms are established as the premise for government action. This two-stage 
power process contains two fundamental uncertainties, so that the actions of 
those subject to power is not fully determined by those exercising power. 
Uncertainty arises in the attempts of the political parties to identify citizen 
demands
20. As attitude research has shown, these demands are neither 
unambiguous, nor stable or transitive in the sense of motivational hierarchy. 
20 To avoid all misunderstanding: in this case those subject to power are the political decision 
makers, and those exercising power are the citizens. 34 
This either provides the political parties with action space or imposes 
restrictions on their actions (depending on the point of view taken). Uncertainty 
also arises in the implementation of the platforms of elected parties in the form 
of governmental action or decision-making. Governmental action is subject to 
complex and changing reality restrictions, which if nothing else limit the 
unimpaired implementation of programmatic projects. This defective 
implementation could be structurally counteracted by the constitutional 
introduction of an imperative mandate. However, sustaining the adaptability of 
governmental action to complex and changing reality restrictions is one of the 
reasons why the imperative mandate is expressly excluded as a structural 
element in representative democracies. This type of uncertainty can of course be 
evaluated in different ways depending on the prevailing democratic norm. But 
it clearly shows that an empirically ascertained heavy dependence of party 
platforms on current citizen demands or of governmental decisions on the 
platforms of governing parties is not to be regarded, in the sense of normative 
democratic theory, as positive per se
21. 
Whereas the power-controlled transmission of selections generates uncertain-
ties and thus action space up to the decision-making stage, the situation 
changes in the (formal) democratic process from the decision-making stage 
onward. Decisions are made binding by constitutions, and within the 
government system this holds true for implementation by the administrative 
authorities. And outside the government system for acceptance of implemented 
decisions by the actors of the public system. This has already been discussed 
when dealing with action products (see also Figure 3). Where the democratic 
process is conceived of as a power process, the mandatory nature of decisions 
makes the transmission of the selections made by those in power to those 
subject to that power an unambiguous process. Whoever is subject to power 
must accept the selections of those exercising power as the premises for his own 
action to which no alternative is permitted. 
21 Empirically ascertaining how one action product is determined by another can occur, for 
instance, in the form of prognostication by linear regression. This method has been used in 
the cited analyses by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, predicting governmental action on 
the basis of party platforms. 35 
Analysis of the democratic process has hitherto regarded this process as a 
directed chain of action products of specific collective actors. This sequence of 
action products has been described in terms of selection and transformation. 
The aspect that has been neglected is that this selection and transformation 
occurs within the framework of a differentiation of the political system into 
subsystems. It is this aspect we wish to address. We will thus turn our attention 
to the internal differentiation of the political system in liberal democracies. 
4.2 Internal Differentiation of the Political System 
4.2.1 Differentiation into Three Subsystems 
A social system is differentiated when there has developed both a specific 
structure and a generalized action orientation of actors, the networking of 
whom constitutes the structure. This definition must be applied to the internal 
differentiation of social systems, which basically obey the same logic of 
differentiation as that prevailing in the superordinate social system. The 
discussion on the internal differentiation of the political system will proceed in 
three steps. We will begin by examining which subsystems are to be 
differentiated in the first place, will then assign collective actors to these 
subsystems, and will finally describe the generalized action orientations of the 
actors in the respective subsystems. 
To describe the internal differentiation of the political system, we turn once 
again to the general function or action orientation of the political system, which 
consists in the production of collectively binding decisions. The meaning or 
reference of this general function is, however, subject to historical processes of 
definition. During the long development and consolidation phase of European 
nation states, this function manifested itself primarily in persistent political 
action on the part of rulers to safeguard their power over the nation state. This 
reproduction consisted essentially in the maintenance (or extension) of territory 
by stabilizing borders externally and in the administrative penetration of this 
territory internally. The prerequisite for both types of reproduction of rule over 36 
the nation state is the existence of a power centre with a monopoly of the 
exercise of power
22. This definitional restriction of state action to an interest in 
self-preservation was abandoned as western European countries develop into 
welfare states. This development has been described and analysed in detail 
elsewhere (Flora, Alber and Kohl 1977, Luhmann 1981c, Alber 1982, Roller 
1992). It is true that the reproduction of rule did (or could) involve specific 
performances by the rulers for society, such as the safeguarding of peace 
externally and the establishment of order internally. However, as the welfare 
state developed, these core political functions provide only the basis for a 
growing allocation of tasks to the state, or of expectations of performance by the 
state (Mayntz 1988, 39). A clear exchange relationship arose only with this 
catalogue of welfare state tasks. Those exercising power provide society with 
the welfare performances expected by society, and receive in return tax revenue 
and generalized support. This exchange relationship marks the political system 
as a performance system. A current example of how welfare state development 
dynamics still functions is the discussion in Germany on whether it is advisable 
to entrench state goals in the constitution (see Luhmann 1981 on the logic of 
welfare state development). Regardless of whether this occurs, the discussion 
alone reflects what relevant social groups expect from the action of the state. 
Whether the attempt to abate these expectations and to impose new limits on 
state action - such as occurred in Britain in the eighties - can be successful in the 
long term, or whether it must fail due to more deep-seated structural 
development trends in modern societies, can at this point be mentioned only in 
passing as a significant problem. 
Differentiating a social system on the basis of performance has to do with 
differentiating 'clearly defined producer and acceptor roles' in relation to 
performance (Mayntz 1988,19). The specific configuration of producer roles is a 
structural characteristic of the governmental system and the specific 
configuration of acceptor roles is a structural characteristic of the public system. 
The term 'public' is taken from Luhmann (1970, 163) and Parsons (1969, 208), 
22 See Flora (1983) on the coming into being and consolidation of the European nation states. 37 
while that of 'governmental system' from Parsons alone (1969, 207, 312)
23. 
Instead of governmental system, Luhmann refers to 'bureaucratic 
administration'. However, if one of the collective actors of the 'decision-making 
system' is to be serve to denote the system as a whole, we find Parson's concept 
the more plausible one, since in the last instance it is government and 
parliament that produce binding decisions, whereas the bureaucratic 
administration is specialized in elaborating the adopted decision premises. 
Regardless of the terms used, distinguishing a 'production system' for 
performances (governmental system) and an 'acceptor system
1 for performances 
(public system) is the fundamental distinction made by practically all systems 
theories of politics. 
The interactions between producers and acceptors in performance systems are 
exchange processes of performance and counter-performance. In most systems 
theories of politics, this exchange relationship is drawn out in content and time. 
The governmental system provides binding decisions of a certain type at the 
output end (see Parsons 1969, 209). In negative cases a withdrawal of support 
occurs at the input end on the occasion of the next election. The background to 
this stretching of the exchange relationship is the assumption that in making 
decisions a political system can 'adjust to fluctuating societal problem 
situations' only if an 'almost motiveless, self-evident acceptance of binding 
decisions occurs' (Luhmann 1970, 159). If we take this premise as our point of 
departure, it is sufficient to have political process models terminate with the 
implemented decisions passed on to the environment without further analysing 
either transmission or acceptance. Transmission to the environment is generally 
referred to by the unspecific term 'outputs'. At this point we will not discuss 
whether the motiveless acceptance of implemented decisions by the acceptor 
really is a functional condition of the political system, but will adopt the 
plausible postulate that this is in fact no longer the case
24. In the model of the 
democratic process we have already presented (see Figure 2), we therefore take 
23 Parson's exact terms for the two subsystems are 'public' and 'government'. 
24 This assumption is, of course, also to be understood as a metatheoretical 'jumping the gun', 
which as a verifiable hypothesis can be investigated empirically. 38 
up Luhmann's idea of differentiating the roles of the public system into roles 
that are to be assigned to either the input end or the output end of the polity 
(Luhmann 1970, 164 et seq.). In contrast to Luhmann, we suspect that there are 
exchange relations between the polity and the public system not only at the 
input end of the democratic process, but also at the output end. The acceptance 
of implemented decisions is not already unambiguously determined by the 
binding nature of these decisions. It is a factor that is variable within certain 
limits, and which is also influenced by the public's evaluation of these 
implemented decisions. A nuclear power station or a motorway through a 
nature reserve, for example, will not necessarily be constructed only because 
this has been resolved in the polity's legal decision-making process. The extent 
to which the public accepts implemented decisions is likely in its turn to affect 
the outcomes of policy planning, in energy policy or transport policy, for 
example
25. At a more general level the conditional acceptance of the polity's 
implemented decisions by the public can be described with the aid of Parson's 
distinction between power-based and influence-based communication 
processes (1969, 410 et seq.; on this distinction see also Gerhards 1993, 30 et 
seq.), and thus pin-pointed with greater conceptual precision. A power-based 
transmission of selections (implemented decisions) would mean unquestioning 
acceptance of these selections by the public. The motive for acceptance would 
then primarily be the possibility of taking negative sanctions including coercive 
measures (supported by the state monopoly of power). The motive for 
acceptance in the case of influence-based transmission of selections is, by 
contrast, to be found in the extent of the persuasive force that actor x exercises 
on actor y. If our hypothesis of conditional acceptance of the polity's 
implemented decisions by the public is tenable, then the public system has 
succeeded in establishing communication with the polity at the output end of 
the democratic process largely on the basis of influence, and in persuading the 
polity to waive force as a medium of communication. However, this presents 
the polity with the problem that the output end of the democratic process also 
becomes contingent. One possible way to react structurally to this increase in 
25 This effect is taken into account in the chain of action products in the model of the democra-
tic process (see Figure 2). 39 
contingency would be to draw a distinction between special functional roles to 
mobilize support for decisions already implemented. The establishment of 
public relations departments in the various administrative bodies can be 
interpreted as characteristic of this 'form of adaptation'. 
In contrast to the output end of the political process
26, the input end has seen a 
specialized subsystem develop to mediate between the public system and the 
governmental system. In view of its nature we refer to it as an intermediation 
system. In the corning chapters we will attempt to elucidate the precise nature or 
logic of this intermediation. The intermediation system is essentially the same 
as Luhmann's 'party politics' (1970, 163). Luhmann sees the function of this 
subsystem as arising from the political system's fundamental openness to 
societal topics and problems requiring collectively binding decisions. As a 
result, according to Luhmann, mobilizing political support for governmental 
system action becomes a permanent necessity for the maintenance of the polity. 
The structure within which mobilization takes place is the regulated 
competition between parties for the voter's favour. The vote itself is thus the 
manifest form of mobilized support. Luhmann claims that the primary sense of 
this distinct function of the intermediation system is to discharge the 
governmental system from the job of mobilizing support. It is only this relief 
that permits the governmental system to concentrate on the 'elaboration and 
issuance of binding decisions' (Luhmann 1970, 164) pursuant to the 
programmatic premises for which support has been mobilized by the interme-
diation system (see also Parsons 1969, 208 et seq.). Exercising the functions of 
the intermediation system also involves selecting and transforming public 
demands (see Figure 3), a prerequisite for the effective processing of public 
demands by governmental system decision-making. 
26 A different approach would be to differentiate the administration into government depart-
mental bureaucracy and local administration. The latter could then be claimed to fulfil an 
intermediation function between the governmental system and the public system at the 
output end. However, we feel that this differentiation cannot be made with such clarity as to 
permit two distinct systems within the administration to be postulated. An alternative 
would be differentiation into government departmental bureaucracy and local bureaucracies 
as subsystems of the administration system. 40 
Gerhards takes a somewhat different approach in conceptualizing an interme-
diation system between public and governmental systems. He advances the 
more general thesis that subsystem-specific publics mediate between 
'performance roles and public system roles' in all differentiated societal 
subsystems. In the case of the political system the subsystem in question is the 
political public (Gerhards 1993, 22). The political public is defined as an 
'intermediate communication system' that mediates 'topics and problems of 
society as a whole ... to the political decision-making system...' (Gerhards 1993, 
23). This definition has far-reaching implications. The subject matter mediated 
is societal topics and problems. If we relate this to the differentiation into 
performance system and public system, between which two the subsystemic 
public mediates, this subject matter must be assigned to the public system. The 
character of this intermediation is thus primarily the communicative 
transmission of these topics and problems from the public system to the 
performance system. This finds its expression in the term 'intermediary 
communication systems'. This conceptualization of an intermediation system 
can find no place in our model of the democratic process, since it requires 
unambiguous localization. The model is less concerned with the communicative 
transmission of information (topics and problems) than with the fulfilling of 
specific functions, first the screening off of the governmental system against the 
imperatives of permanently mobilizing support for current decision-making, 
and second the transformation of public demands to render the latter amenable 
to processing by the governmental system's decision-making activities. It is thus 
a question of specific actors producing quite specific action products (see 
Figures 2 and 3). These functions, similarly defined in various systems theories, 
cannot be performed by the political public as a communication systems that 
primarily communicates demands to the governmental system. In our model it 
is rather the political public that generates the problems necessitating an 
intermediation system. 
Gerhards' later argumentation implies greater proximity to our model of the 
democratic process. He restricts the meaning of political public to the 
generation of public opinion and allocates it to a model of the policy process 41 
(Gerhards 1993, 27-29). Thus localized, the political public is described as a 
'opinion-formation system'
2
7 to be situated at the input end of the political 
decision-making process. This allows two conclusions to be drawn. The 
question we have raised, and which we consider decisive, of who and how this 
public opinion is mediated to the political decision-making system remains 
unanswered. Intermediation is thus once again reduced to the (influential) 
transmission of citizens' demands to the actors of the decision-making system. 
These demands take the form of public opinion. For Gerhards (1993, 26) public 
opinion is a substitute indicator for citizens' demands. We will be returning to 
this definition of public opinion in the metatheory of the democratic process. 
But even in the form of public opinion, one is still dealing with demands 
involving the problem of selection and transformation to make them amenable 
to processing by the decision-making system. In our model of the democratic 
process this is one of the functions of the intermediation system. 
4.2.2 The Collective Actors of the Three Subsystems 
4.2.2.1 The Collective Actors of the Governmental System 
Differentiated social systems in complex societies gain their structure from the 
interaction patterns of collective actors, who in this capacity represent role 
linkages. The structure of these systems can thus be determined both via the 
linkage of individual roles and via the linkage of role complexes. The 
identification of the relevant collective actors of the system is a prerequisite for 
the definition of such structures. We will be attempting this for the three 
subsystems of the political system. 
The relevant structural elements of systems are defined as collective actors to 
account for the metatheoretical postulate of introducing actor reference into 
systems theory. These collective actors can of course be understood as systems 
at a lower level of generalization. Rucht (1991, 7 et seq.), for example, refers to 
parties, associations and movements as systems of interest mediation, and the 
mass media as systems of information mediation. In our theoretical context, 
27 It would be more exact to call it a system for the formation of public opinion. 42 
however, this terminology would mean a loss of necessary specificity. In 
drawing a distinction between systems determining action and systems capable 
of action, Schimank has stressed the necessity of differentiation within the 
category of the system. But even within the context of Schimank's 
argumentation, systems capable of action gain in precision if termed collective 
actors, since this establishes a point of reference that can make it clear what a 
system capable of action actually is. 
At the first level of meaning, the concept of the collective actor implies an active 
collectivity. If action is defined as intentional action i.e., as action directed 
towards the attainment of goals, this presupposes that collectivities are also 
capable of such intentional action. The plausibility of this assumption increases 
in proportion to the explicitness and clarity with which the collectivity sets its 
goals and with which these goals consolidate in specific roles with internal 
authority to issue instructions and external authority to represent interests. This 
condition applies most stringently to formal organizations. The more a 
'collective actor' deviates from these characteristics the more difficult it becomes 
to regard him as such and thus include him in the analysis. We will be coming 
back to this point especially in our discussion of the citizen as collective actor. 
At this point we must specify what we mean by collectivity. Our principle 
source for the concept is Parsons (1969, 21), for whom a collectivity is a 
structural unit of social systems, the primary function of which is the 
attainment of goals. Collectivities are not composed of individuals. They are a 
specific aggregate of roles. From this point of view, individuals are merely 
necessary substrata of role action. Roles are thus described by Parsons (1969,21) 
as 'boundary structures' in so far as they establish a relationship to individuals, 
which, however, as individuals belong to the environment of the collectivity. 
With regard to roles, Parsons (1969, 31) introduces two further constituent 
specifications for collectivities. There must be roles permitting a clear 
distinction between members and non-members, and an internal role 
differentiation in terms of status. This latter aspect relates to the criterion we 
have already discussed that the more distinctly a collectivity's goals are 43 
differentiated and consolidated in corresponding roles the better it can be 
identified. 
There are marked differences in the degree of certitude with which collective 
actors can be assigned to the subsystems of the political system. The 
explanatory effort involved is correspondingly unequal. It is easiest with the 
collective actors in the governmental system. The governmental system 
constitutes the core of the political system, since, within the framework of the 
overall democratic process, it is specialized in the actual production and 
implementation of binding decisions
28. The fact that the governmental system 
can make decisions that are binding on the whole of society, and the fact that 
the basis for this decision-making activity is the monopolization and control of 
physical coercion, requires the detailed legal codification of the individual roles 
and role complexes in this subsystem of politics (Luhmann 1987, 149). As a 
consequence of this detailed legal codification by the constitution, the structure 
of the governmental system is highly formalized. This also means that is clear 
which collective actors belong to this subsystem and what the function of these 
collective actors is. In describing the action products of the democratic process, 
a distinction has been drawn within the governmental system between 
decisions and implementations (see Figure 2). Decisions refer more precisely to 
the production of premises for decision-making and to the issuance of 
implemented decisions. Both are products of the parliamentary and governmental 
action
29. The premises for decision-making are specified by the administration, 
that is to say translated into detailed economic and legal rules of procedure
30. 
28 The activities of actors in the governmental system are thus not only preliminary stages in 
decision formation. 
29 For the sake of simplicity the model of the democratic process takes only parliament and 
government into account. In presidential systems the president must naturally be included 
as actor. 
30 A further possible subdivision of the administration would be into government 
departmental bureaucracy and local administration (we have already addressed this aspect). 
In this division of functions it is the government departmental bureaucracy that is especially 
responsible for implementing decision-making premises, while local administrative 
authorities have the task of transmitting these implemented decisions to the societal 44 
The outcomes of this specification are referred to as implementations, and after 
having been adopted by government and parliament, it is the implemented 
decisions that are finally transmitted to the societal environment as binding 
decisions. 
4.2.2.2 The Collective Actors of the Intermediation System 
The intermediation system as a subsystem of the political system mediates 
between the governmental system and the public system i.e., it mediates 
between two social systems. We have already explained that individuals belong 
to the environment of social systems and collectivities. In their role as citizens 
they belong to the political system, and the links between the individual citizen 
roles constitute the collectivity of citizens. This collectivity is one of the actors in 
the public system. For this reason, a sociological analysis of the exchange 
relations between two social systems cannot examine the intermediation 
between individuals and the governmental system. This is, for example, the 
analytical perspective taken by Rucht (1991), in which interest groups, mass 
media, and political parties all become intermediation systems
31. We, on the 
other hand, consider that only the political parties can be regarded as collective 
actors in the intermediation system, assigning interest groups and the mass 
media to the public system
32. This classification of political parties as the 
dominant actors in the intermediation system is also indicated by Luhmann 
when he refers to the intermediation system as 'party polities', and is clearly 
stated by Parsons. According to the latter (1969, 209), the exchange process 
between the public system and the governmental system is carried out by the 
environment. Local administration decides in which concrete instances the implemented 
decisions should and maybe applied. 
31 This analytical perspective also relates to the well-known differentiation into micro, meso 
and macro levels. 
32 Interest groups and the mass media naturally also 'mediate' the interests or demands of 
citizens to the actors of the polity. This is already contained in the concept of the articulation 
of interests and demands. But this very broad intermediation concept does not allow the 
conclusion that these actors belong to or constitute an intermediation system of their own 
that fulfils specific functions within the framework of the democratic process. This has 
already been justified in Chapter 4.2.1, and will be expanded in the context of this chapter. 45 
party system. Analyses that are not primarily couched in systems theoretical 
terms argue similarly (Sartori 1976, ix, von Beyme 1984, 22, 374). It is thus pos-
sible to produce sufficient respectable references for the assumption that the 
political parties are the collective actors in the intermediation system. But this 
does not answer the question why this should be so. Since regarding 
intermediation systems and party systems as equivalent, and thus excluding 
interest groups from the intermediation system, is not uncontroversial, we will 
attempt to justify this definition with greater precision. 
In the liberal democracies, the exercise of popular power by means of elections 
is coupled with a competitive party system. The institutional arrangement of 
the competitive party system constitutes this as the intermediation system. 
Before each election the parties have to offer the citizens both politicians to 
occupy the decision-making positions, and especially programmes (platforms) 
that are to be realized. Both these offers are made with the prospect of possible 
occupation of the decision-making positions. For this reason it makes no sense 
to assign the parties as such to the governmental system from the outset (only a 
subset of the competing parties can form the government, and only a subset of 
the competing politicians gets into parliament). It also makes no sense to assign 
them to the public system, since they articulate no demands, but on the 
contrary have to take articulated demands into account in order to be elected. 
This implies two things. First, a selection of demands (not all can be realized by 
governmental action) and second proposals on realizing demands. Precisely the 
selection and transformation of demands
3
3 make it possible for the 
governmental system to make effective decisions after the election. To this 
extent the parties mediate between the demands of the public system and the 
decisions of the governmental system. 
The nature of the intermediation between these two subsystems by the political 
parties can also be elucidated from another perspective. If we accept the 
dominant rationality of political party action to acquire and retain power, this 
33 In the model of the democratic process (see Figure 2) the demands selected and transformed 
by the parties are referred to as issues and programmes. 46 
action rationality and the electoral mechanism define a double perspective of 
the political parties. First the acquisition Of power at the current election and 
second the retention of power at the next election. This implies that the political 
parties must to a certain extent interlace the input and output perspectives of 
the polity from the outset. Precisely this double perspective provides 
mediations between the public and the governmental systems because it links 
up differing action rationalities, optimum responsiveness to the demands of the 
public system and the most effective realization possible of these demands. To 
what extent individual parties act rationally in this sense and actually link up 
the two perspectives is certain to depend on ancillary factors. One such factor is 
likely to be the extent to which political parties succeed in transforming 
themselves from parties with a clear cut ideological commitment into 'catchall' 
parties
34, thus gaining in relative flexibility with regard to citizens' demands. A 
further factor is likely to be the utility of the long-term perspective (next 
election) over the short-term perspective (current election). This calculation will 
doubtless be decisively influenced by the probability of winning the current 
election. If there is no danger of having to keep promises, a lot of promises can 
be made. Regardless of the situation in which individual parties find 
themselves, what distinguishes political parties from interest groups as 
collective actors in the political system is that they can potentially occupy 
political offices
3
5 (von Beyme 1984, 23). And for structural reasons this 
constitutional possibility places the political parties - and them alone - in a 
position to exercise the necessary mediation function between the 
governmental system and the public system. The intermediation system of a 
political system in representative democracies is thus largely identical with its 
party system. 
34 Such parties are referred to by various names such as 'cross-class parties', or in Germany 
'Volksparteien'. The various names indicate various aspects and have arisen in differing 
contexts. What is important for our purposes is that such parties loosen their close ties to 
very specific group interests and very specific programmatic goals, thus gaining in flexibility 
in their responsiveness to public demands. 
35 Because interest groups do not have this possibility, they do not have to relate their 
demands to others nor possibly postpone or drop them. They do not have to select or 
transform demands as political parties have to do. 47 
4.2.2.3 The Collective Actors of the Public System 
4.2.2.3.1 The Citizens 
The basis for legitimacy in representative democracies is essentially the fact that 
the power process originates with the citizen and returns to him via a feedback 
process. This gives rise to a circular power process with the citizens as the fixed 
point. The collectivity of citizens is accordingly the decisive collective actor in 
the public system. But to what extent and how are the citizens to be considered 
as a collectivity capable of acting or merely as an aggregation of individual 
citizens whose collective character consists only in the computed majority of 
votes cast? Before we can settle this question we must decide what we mean by 
'collectivity of citizens'. 
The collectivity of citizens has a highly formalized dimension in the sense that 
the constitutions of Western representative democracies lay down precisely 
who belongs to the collectivity and what rights and duties this membership 
imposes. Membership is thus clearly defined. This meets the first criterion for 
the existence of a collectivity. The whole complex of membership status and the 
rights and duties involved is frequently referred to as the institution of 
citizenship. The central components of this institution have been addressed 
from differing theoretical perspectives by Marshall (1965), Parsons (1969) and 
Heater (1990). The first component is the securing of fundamental civil rights, 
the second is the provision of political participation and the third is the 
guarantee of certain 'welfare state' performances, such as a provision of a 
minimum standard of living, universal education etc. These three components 
developed historically more or less in the above order. Whereas the basic rights 
component addresses the fundamental relation between citizens and the state 
with regard to the state monopoly on the exercise of power, and thus the 
fundamentals of the democratic process as a whole, the political participation 
component is to be assigned to the input end of the democratic process, and the 
welfare state component to the output end. However, the participation 
component is the major structuring and dynamic factor in the democratic 
process, primarily defined by the principle of free, equal and secret elections. 48 
But this formalization of the voter role segments the collectivity of citizens into 
equal units to the exclusion of hierarchical differentiation, where the highest 
position could represent the intentions of the collectivity as a whole. 
Elucidation of the collective nature of this collectivity thus shifts to other levels. 
One such level is that proposed by Parsons (1969,19,21, 40, 42), when he posits 
a legitimate norm system and a 'sufficient' degree of solidarity, cohesion or 
sense of community as defining characteristics of a collectivity. Collectivities 
thus also, or perhaps mainly, constitute themselves as 'imagined communities' 
(Easton 1965, 171-189; Anderson 1991; Fuchs, Gerhards and Roller 1993). The 
constitution can be understood as the legitimate normative order of the 
collectivity of citizens - naturally only in so far as it is also held to be legitimate 
by the citizens. The points of reference for generating and sustaining a sense of 
community can be extremely various. In western European nation states, 
differing combinations of territorial, religious, ethnic and other factors have 
served and continue to serve as the basis for a sense of community (Fuchs, 
Gerhards and Roller 1993). In Germany a debate has been running for some 
time on the question of the extent to which the constitution as the legitimate 
normative order is also apt to provide the basis for a sense of community. 
Sternberger (1990) has introduced the concept of 'constitutional patriotism', 
which has found widespread acceptance. Regardless of the plausibility of so 
cognitive a basis for a belief in community, it must be assumed that without a 
community that is believed in or felt to exist - on whatever basis - it is not 
possible to speak of a collectivity of citizens, or possible only in a very restricted 
sense of the term. The degree of collectiveness of this collectivity is not only 
theoretically determinable but especially an empirical matter. At all events, the 
extent of cohesion and solidarity within the collectivity of citizens is likely to be 
a factor with far-reaching political consequences. An example of such 
consequences is presented by the current difficulties political decision-makers 
in Germany are experiencing in their attempts to harness the solidarity of the 
collectivity in mobilizing understanding for the necessity of making sacrifices to 
aid the reconstruction of reunited Germany. This also illustrate Easton's (1965, 49 
171-189) general thesis that the 'sense of community' is a fundamental resource 
of all political systems that principally takes effect in times of crisis. 
A final question to be considered with regard to the collectivity of citizens has 
to do with its capacity to act as a collectivity as opposed to the capacity to act of 
its individual members (e.g, as voters). Such a capacity to act presupposes that 
collectivity interests can be identified in the first place, and that these interests 
can somehow be implemented by action, or be relevant for action in some 
broad sense of the term. In both respects the mass media and interest groups, as 
further collective actors in the public system, exercise a statable function for the 
collectivity of citizens. This hypothesis rests on two premises. 1 In highly 
modern societies there are no longer any limited and stable citizens' interests. 
Interests are complex and fluctuating. 2 The individual citizens, being as 
individuals the vehicle of whole complexes of roles, 'can become involved in 
the action context of the political system only in a selective, intermittent, and 
situation-related manner'
3
6 (Mayntz 1988, 32). Collective actors must be 
differentiated to compensate these two 'deficiencies' of the citizens and to give 
them collective form. The mass media and interest groups can fulfil this 
function each in their own way. A conceptual excursus is necessary in pursuing 
this thesis. 
The point of reference of the excursus is the collectivity of citizens. Let us 
resume what we mean by the term. If we are to talk about a collectivity of 
citizens at all, a necessary rninimum criterion is a rule of membership to 
establish clearly who belongs to the collectivity and who does not. This draws a 
formal external boundary. Internally a certain degree of solidarity and sense of 
community are necessary, although it is not possible theoretically to establish 
how far this must go. The degree of community of interests is a further level. 
These three levels build on one another and determine how marked the 
36 This premise is at least plausible. With the help of the evident fact that individuals are 
bound up in complex role acting, it is possible to explain the phenomenon that the citizen, 
while having a marked willingness to participate in a wide variety of forms of political 
action, in fact does so relatively seldom (see Fuchs 1991b). Having a range of roles to play 
produces the problem of allocating time to the various options for action. 50 
collective nature of the collectivity is. These levels all relate to the integration of 
the overall collectivity. At least in modern societies, however, a societal 
collectivity is layered 'downwards'. That is to say that below this level of 
integration there exist so-called 'solidary groupings' (Parsons) i.e., smaller 
collectivities forming part of the overall collectivity. Within the category of 
citizens we have thus drawn a distinction between the overall collectivity and 
subcollectivities. Both types of collectivity can only act within the framework of 
the democratic process if they address interests and demands to the polity. In 
Figure 4 the interests of the overall collectivity are called collective interests and 
the interests of the respective subcollectivities are called particular interests. 
Individual interests are introduced to complete this analytical differentiation, 
referring to the interests of the respective individual citizen. 
Figure 4: A Typology of Interests and Goods 
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Interests have already been defined as action goals of individual and collective 
actors, who seek to attain these goals within the framework of situational and 
structural constraints (see Chapter 4.1). How can this definition be 
operationalized with regard to the empirical identification of interests? If it can 
be assumed that there is always a variety of goals for the individual citizens 
that they want to attain by their political action the question is which of these 51 
goals is to be given priority
37. Only current (priority) goals among the mass of 
possible goals are referred to as interests. These can be assumed to be decisive 
for the actual action of individuals. Empirically to determine citizens' interests it 
is accordingly necessary to establish the hierarchy of goal preferences. Individual 
interests are thus the goals of individual that rank relatively high in the 
hierarchy of his preferences for possible goals.
3
8 This fundamental 
consideration also holds true for definition of particular interests and collective 
interests. But since by definition collectivities are composed of a multiplicity of 
members, an additional criterion is necessary for the relationship between the 
preference hierarchies of the individual members. The only plausible criterion 
we can see it the majority rule. Particular interests, that is to say the interests of a 
subcollectivity of citizens are thus interests that are ranked relatively highly by 
the majority of members of this subcollectivity. The same definition is to be 
applied to collective interests, with the difference that reference is then to the 
overall collectivity of citizens. 
In Figure 4 a distinction is made between interests and goods. The three 
categories of good are based on the classical analysis by Musgrave (1959), who 
took the possibility of exclusion of enjoyment of a good as the decisive criterion 
for differentiation. Collective goods are thus characterized by the fact that no-
one may be excluded from enjoying them even if he has not contributed to their 
production. In the case of individual goods, by contrast, utility of the good is 
directly coupled to consideration, that is to say us has a price. In applying Mus-
grave's definition to our analysis, collective goods are those goods that every 
member of the overall collectivity of citizens may enjoy. Particular goods are 
those goods that only a subcollectivity of citizens may use, and individual goods 
are goods that may be used only by a subset of citizens without this subset 
constituting a subcollectivity. 
37 In action situations it is completely unrealistic to seek to attain a large number of goals let 
alone all goals. 
38 It cannot be established theoretically how high in the preference hierarchy an action goal 
must rank to qualify as an interest. This question can be solved only empirically and prag-
matically. 52 
In Figure 4 the differentiated types of interest and the differentiated types of 
good are related to one another. Three logically possible links are not made (see 
hatched part of the matrix). It is not plausible that the overall collectivity of 
citizens articulates the interests that relate to the production of particular and 
individual goods, that is to day to goods that a section of its members are 
excluded from using. For the same reason it is not plausible that a 
subcollectivity formulates the production of individual goods as one of its 
interests. On the premise of rational action in conformity with the self-interest 
theorem, we would have to assume that the interests of the overall collectivity 
relate to collective goods, the interests of subcollectivities to particular goods, 
and the interests of individuals to individual goods. If this assumption is 
basically correct, it becomes important to ask under what conditions 
individuals take an interest in the production of particular and collective goods 
(we will be looking at certain aspects of this later). After this conceptual 
excursus we can now explicate with greater precision the function of the mass 
media and interest groups for the citizens within the framework of the 
democratic process. 
4.2.2.3.2 The Mass Media 
The mass media are not to be understood as collective actors in the same sense 
as, for example, interest groups and political parties. This is because they are 
also, or even primarily, a medium of intermediation between all collective 
actors of the political system
39. For this reason we must discover how the mass 
media can be assigned the status of a collective actor with a statable function in 
the democratic process. In particular this requires evidence to be furnished of a 
39 We stress again that the intermediary nature of the mass media does not invite the 
conclusion that they have the function of an intermediation system between the public 
system and the governmental system. Media mediation of topics, opinions etc. is not the 
only form of intermediation, and it mediates not only between the actors of the public 
system and the government, but also between actors within the public system and between 
those within the governmental system. These aspects apply regardless of the thesis already 
addressed that the intermediation system of politics has quite specific functions for the 
democratic process that the mass media in particular are incapable of performing (see 
Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.2). 53 
specific action product that is produced by this collective actor and that is 
relevant to the democratic process. So-called public opinion can be posited as this 
action product. The nature of the mass media as medium determines that 
opinions are published there. But what distinguishes published opinion from 
public opinion? The decisive characteristic of public opinion is the successful 
suggestion to the public by the mass media that published opinion expresses a 
majority opinion of the citizens, and that this opinion also has a relatively high 
priority rating for them. This is the significance of public opinion, as Gerhards 
(1993,11, 26 et seq.) has also stressed. Public opinion is constructed by the mass 
media in the mass media. This thesis does not exclude actors seeking to 
influence this construction process outside the mass media
40. It can be assumed 
that the discrepancy or homogeneity of external attempts to exercise influence 
weaken or strengthen the rationality and selectivity within the mass media 
system
41. The decisive circumstance is, however, that in the final instance it is 
the mass media themselves that in obedience to their own rationality and 
selectivity logic can generate public opinion more or less via published opinion, 
thus establishing the suggestion that they represent the collective interests of 
the citizens. This suggestion has a double effect with far-reaching consequences 
for the democratic process. First, the citizens can, precisely as an outcome of 
this suggestion, adopt as their own what is suggested to them as a majority 
opinion, thus actually forming a majority with the corresponding consequences 
for electoral behaviour. Exactly how such mechanisms function has still to be 
investigated. Noelle-Neumann's (1989) explication of what she calls 'opinion 
climate' and 'silence spiral' is one of the few attempts to describe the 
mechanisms theoretically and empirically. The second relevant effect has to do 
with to the actors of the polity. The more successfully the mass media convey 
40 This issue is discussed by mass communication research under the heading of 'agenda-buil-
ding'. 
41 Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990) and Gerhards (1992) describe in detail the rationalities and 
selectivities of the mass media specific to the system. One of the most important elements in 
mass media action logic in producing public opinion is the drive to justify a point of view by 
reference to generally accepted values. This implies, for example, that an actor who pursues 
particular interests when participating in public discourse has to present this interest as a 
collective one. 54 
the suggestion of a majority opinion, the more rational it becomes for these 
actors to accept this as a substitute for the contingent interests and demands of 
the citizens (see also Gerhards 1993,26 et seq. and Luhmann 1988,175). But this 
substitution takes places only because there is conjecture about an actual or 
potential majority among citizens. The actors of the polity naturally cannot with 
any assume degree of certainty that public opinion on a topic really represents a 
current collective interest of the citizens, even if they believe it likely. This is 
probably one of the reasons why the actors of the polity attempt to obtain 
indications on the contingent interests of the citizens that could be relevant in 
deciding how to vote both by watching the mass media and by conducting 
surveys. Surveys alone are insufficient because they provide only snapshots of 
the permanent generation process of citizens' interests, interests which can 
rapidly change and the change of which can be influenced by the mass media. 
Watching the mass media alone is not enough for two reasons. On this basis it 
cannot with certainty be decided whether public opinion really represents the 
collective interests of the citizens, and it is unclear whether these collective 
interests have relatively higher priority in influencing how the citizens vote 
than, for example, the particular interests of subcollectivities of which the 
citizens are also members. 
Let us illustrate the putative importance and effect of public opinion with a 
particular topic that also brings up the contingency problem again. Voters have 
to decide how to vote under conditions of great uncertainty. They cannot know 
how the political parties will act once they are elected. Downs (1957) sees a lack 
of the information necessary for a rational decision on how to vote as being 
characteristic of this situation. Nor can the lack be remedied by comparing the 
platforms of the competing parties, since voters know that such platforms are at 
least to some extent formulated from a tactical point of view, and that none of 
the parties will be in a position to keep all electoral promises. One rational 
possibility to counteract this lack of information is to be guided by what was 
actually done in the previous legislative period. In such a procedure the 
governing parties enjoy a structural advantage, since it only makes sense to 
vote for an opposition party if the governing parties have a distinctly negative 55 
record. Fiorina has described this sort of voter rationality as 'retrospective 
voting' (see also Popkin 1991; Fuchs and Kuhnel 1993). In so far as such 
retrospective voting occurs, the opinion of the individual voter on the subject of 
'government performance' is decisive for his decision on who to give his vote 
to. There is, however, a further problem concerning the formation of voter 
opinion on this subject. Most voters find it difficult to decide on the basis of 
their primary experience of how governmental action has affected their 
interests. From this point of view it seems likely that voters will be guided by 
public opinion on 'government performance', opinion produced in and by the 
mass media. The real subject matter of the mass media is not the assessment of 
government performance in particular policy fields, but a generalized evaluation. 
Precisely the construction of a public opinion on government performance as a 
whole makes this suitable as an 'information shortcut' for a 'reasoned voter' 
under conditions of 'low-information rationality' (Popkin 1991,7 et seq.). 
The mass media operate in conformity with their own action rationality. 
Against this background we may ask why and how government performance 
can become an issue in the construction of a public opinion in and by the mass 
media. Luhmann (1981a, 317) has introduced actuality as the most important 
criterion for agenda-setting by the mass media, defining the novelty of the topic 
as the most important measure of actuality. Only an actual (i.e., current, 
'topical') topic is able to attract the attention of large numbers of members of the 
public and to set the dynamics of public opinion formation in motion. If 
government performance relates to the entire legislative period, this means that 
the topic must become a long-term one if a public opinion on it is to develop. 
The constraint of actuality permits few topics a long life. Luhmann (1981a, 317) 
cites inflation as an example for a suitable long-term topic, since the rate of 
price increases changes constantly and every change is politically relevant. 
Constantly recurring government actions can similarly be taken as a new event 
to be interpreted each time they happen in the light of a rising or falling 
evaluation of government performance. The fact of deterioration or 
improvement in the assessment of government performance is in its turn of 56 
such vital importance for the public of the mass media that this topic has a good 
chance of being selected. 
Placing government performance on the long-term agenda of the mass media 
constructs a history of the legislative period. Public opinion of government 
performance during the period of the election campaign is more decisive for the 
voting behaviour of the citizens than it is during earlier stretches of the 
legislative period. But this public opinion has constituted itself within the 
framework of the history of the entire legislative period i.e., it is not without 
reference to what has occurred earlier. Even if government performance is 
permanently on the agenda, it cannot entirely escape the logic of 'topic careers' 
(Luhmann 1990, 177). There is little novelty value in it if the mass media detect 
uniformity of government performance. The action rationality of the mass 
media demands a diagnosis of rise or fall. One of the well-established turning 
points for the mise-en-scene of such trends is the 100-day threshold. From the 
perspective of mass media action rationality it is an interesting and important 
question how long such trends can be extended in time without losing their 
novelty value. It is probably not possible to construct a continuous trend 
(whether a rise or a fall) covering the whole of a legislative period without its 
novelty value diminishing and the attention of the public being withdrawn 
after a certain time. If this assumption is tenable, then from the point of view of 
the competing political parties it must be rational to contribute to the 
construction of a trend in public opinion on government performance (agenda-
building) that begins about half-way through the legislative period. For the 
governing parties, this naturally also means constructing an upward trend and 
for the opposition parties a downward trend. 
After having explicated the concept of public opinion, we will now return to 
consideration of the collectivity of citizens. We assumed that the citizens' 
collectivity cannot of itself establish a community of interests. The mass media 
were assigned the specific function of compensating for this deficiency. 
Citizens' collective interests are short-term and changing constructions, 
essentially generated by the mass media and which become manifest in the 
mass media. These constructions were themselves labelled public opinion. 57 
Within the framework of the model of the democratic process, public opinion is 
thus a specific category of demand addressed by the public system to the polity. 
The extent to which the mass media actually fulfil this function of articulating 
and generating collective interests, and the extent to which this is taken for 
granted by actors and affected parties is in the last instance an empirical 
question. On the basis of a case study, Gerhards (1993) shows that at least the 
individual printed media can be assigned to political conflict structures, 
possibly even stabilizing the latter. If it is possible unambiguously to assign 
individual media to such conflict structures, it makes it difficult to posit the 
construction of collective interests by these media, precisely because the 
collectivity of citizens is divided by such conflict structures. As far as Gerhards' 
findings are concerned, it is a moot point whether they were topic-induced, or 
whether they apply with regard to the printed media rather than to television
42. 
We will conclude the discussion of the salience of the mass media in the public 
system with the following conditional formulation. If, under the above 
premises there is such a thing as a collective interest of citizens, it can develop 
only as described with the collaboration of the mass media, and can only 
become manifest in the mass media. The extent to which this function of the 
mass media is not exercised is proportional to the probability of collective 
interests not existing and to the complementary probability of the collectivity of 
citizens being fragmented. 
The peculiarity of the mass media in comparison to other collective actors has 
been described as their 'double nature' of actor and medium. In the context of 
this chapter they have been examined in their capacity as actor. They are an 
actor in so far as they generate a specific action product within the more general 
category of demands. This has been referred to as public opinion, which by its 
nature is a short-term and inconstant construction of the collective interests of 
the citizens. From this analytical perspective the implications of the mass media 
as medium for the democratic process have necessarily been neglected. The 
42 A structural component of the mass media that could be relevant with respect to fulfilment 
of the assigned function is whether television broadcasting is organized on a public or 
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spread and utilization of the mass media (Kiefer 1987) has turned the process of 
communication between the actors of the political system into one that is 
essentially determined by the mass media. The specific rationalities of the mass 
media system cannot thus remain without consequence for this communication 
process. If it is true that selection of events by the mass media is controlled by 
certain news value factors
4
3 (see Luhmann 1971, Schulz 1976, Staab 1990, 
Gerhards 1991), this selectivity is likely to encourage augmented polarization of 
the competing political parties in the intermediation system. Such polarization 
need not necessarily involve a corresponding divergence in substance, but can 
relate to a rhetorical exacerbation of marginal differences, nevertheless 
producing a diffuse impression of conflict and hampering consensual 
processes. However, these aspects have less to do with the specific nature of the 
mass media as collective actors, the particular concern of this chapter, than with 
the fundamental question of the type of communication process in highly 
modern societies that can, among other things, be characterized by the spread 
and utilization of the mass media. 
4.2.2.3.3 Interest Groups 
In addition to the mass media, we have named interest groups as specialized 
collective actors playing a primary part in constituting the collectivity of 
citizens as a collectivity capable of action. This capacity to act relates to the 
articulation of demands vis a vis the actors of the polity. This function of the 
mass media and interest groups does not exclude individual citizens from 
articulating demands. This can, for example, take place at public events 
involving politicians, or by individually contacting politicians. However, this 
sort of demand articulation is probably of little significance for the 
responsiveness of actors of the polity, since it is not sufficiently instructive of 
the distribution of demands in the collectivity of citizens, which alone 
determines electoral success. It is another matter with citizens' opinions 
ascertained by means of representative surveys. Such opinions are not 
43 In addition to the novelty value already mentioned, these include crisis symptoms, scandals, 
surprises, controversies etc. 59 
necessarily identical with far-reaching demands. But if it is possible to establish 
by such measurement techniques that the recorded opinions can also be 
interpreted as demands, then for the actors of the polity such surveys are to a 
certain extent functionally equivalent to the mass media and interest groups in 
ascertaining the demands of the citizens, which they have to take into account if 
they wish to be elected. Substituting surveys for observation of the mass media 
and the interest groups for the purpose of establishing public system demands 
would be rational for the actors of the polity only if the citizens were to produce 
their demands on their own. We assume, however, that the demands of the 
citizens are varied and fluctuating, and that the mass media and the interest 
groups are the principal generators of this fluctuating variety. At the same time, 
only the media and the interest groups are likely to be in a position to 
concentrate and focus this fluctuating variety at given moments (such as during 
the electoral campaign), so that the citizens are given pointers for their political 
action (in particular for their voting behaviour). Thus, in the function they 
exercise within the public system, the mass media and the interest groups do 
not seek expressly and effectively to articulate existing demands of the citizens, 
but also contribute to constructing these demands, thus in a certain fashion also 
to constructing the collectivity of citizens. 
The collectivity of citizens is integrated on two levels. First on that of the overall 
collectivity, and second on that of subcollectivities. In relation to the citizens, 
the function of the mass media is to articulate and generate collective interests, 
and is thus to be assigned to the first level of integration. The corresponding 
function of interest groups is the articulation and generation of particular 
interests, and is thus to be assigned to the second level of integration. The 
literature defines interest groups both in broad and in narrow terms (on the 
concept and analysis of interest groups see Salisbury 1975; von Beyme 1980; von 
Alemann 1987). For the metatheory of the democratic process, the definition of 
Salisbury (1975,175) seems to be an appropriate point of departure. 'An interest 
group is an organized association which engage in activity relative to 
governmental decisions'. For our purposes this definition must be modified and 
supplemented in two ways. First the interests represented by interest groups 60 
relate to interests of subcollectivities of the citizens, and second, representation 
of these interests addresses not the actors Of the governmental system, but the 
actors of the intermediation systeiri. 
The general concept of interest group covers two different types, interest 
associations and social movements. Both can be described as interest groups in so 
far as they are specialized collective actors with the aim of generating and 
articulating the interests of sub-collectivities of the collectivity of citizens. The 
relationship of the two types of interest groups to the citizens is, however, 
established in quite different ways. Interest associations are permanent formal 
organizations with relatively clearly defined corporate purposes. A 
corresponding permanent interaction process occurs between the interest 
associations and the social groups they represent. In this way stable relations 
arise within the public system, which give this system a certain structure. On 
the basis of such stable relations between social groups and interest 
associations, theories have been elaborated claiming the existence of still more 
comprehensive stable relations in the democratic process. The theory of 
political conflict lines (Lipset & Rokkan 1967) assumes that stable relations exist 
between social groups, interest associations and political parties, and the 
Corporatism thesis (Schmitter 1979, 1983) adds administrative units to the list. 
Both theories thus postulate the existence of certain informal structures of the 
democratic process that to a greater or lesser degree span the subsystems. 
However, it is not clear how far this type of democratic process structure can 
still be assumed to apply to 'post-modern' societies (see also Crook, Pakulski 
and Waters 1992). The differentiation of social structure and the dissolution of 
homogeneous social milieux more or less destroys the basis for such informal 
structures. 
Given the nature of social movements, this type of interest group must have a 
quite different relationship with subcollectivities of citizens. The social 
movements form as overt movements only on specific occasions, to relapse into 
a latent state thereafter i.e., they reduce themselves to organizational cores and 61 
everyday networks
44. What distinguishes social movements from interest 
associations within the framework of the public system is thus primarily their 
flexibility with respect to interests of the citizens that cannot be dealt with, or 
can be dealt with only inadequately, by institutionalized interest (the interest 
associations)
45. An example is the interests of the ecological movement, which 
relate to goods which no-one can be excluded from enjoying once they have 
been produced. The situation is somewhat more complicated in the case of the 
interests of the feminist movement, which must initially be regarded as 
particular interests directed to particular goods (in so far as men are to be 
excluded from enjoyment of these goods). The interests of the feminist 
movement are collective goods only if one can argue that they relate to not yet 
acquired collective goods that should long since have been realized as a 
collective good (equality between man and woman). Notwithstanding this 
particular problem, it can be assumed that the interests of social movements in 
the seventies and eighties were largely concerned with the production of 
collective goods. This does not necessarily mean that collective interests were 
involved. This was only the case where a majority of the collectivity of citizens 
gave relatively high priority (relative to particular goods) to the production of 
such goods. On the basis of rational choice theory, Olson (1965) had concluded 
that the development of formal organization to represent collective goods was a 
difficult process, even where collective interests were involved. The main 
reason for this difficulty was the possibility we have already mentioned of 
enjoying the good produced even if one has not contributed to its production. 
From this point of view social movements can be regarded as functionally 
equivalent to formal organizations for the representation of a certain category 
of public system demand
46. Social movements are able to perform this function 
because participating in their collective activities implies a different cost-benefit 
44 At this point we will do no more than record the question whether this latent state can still 
be regarded as a social movement or merely as the necessary substratum of such movements 
that becomes a movement only following successful mobilization of this substratum. 
45 The constituent characteristics of social movements are described in extenso in Offe (1985); 
Rucht (1988), Neidhardt and Rucht (1992), Fuchs and Klingemann (1993). 
46 Differences in the ways interest associations and social movements function concretely 
within the scope of the democratic process have been dealt with by Rucht (1993). 62 
equation than is the case with formal organizations. For one thing the effort of 
participating in such collective action is relatively slight. And for another such 
participation may involve selective incentives, such as expressive experiences, 
that go beyond the propagated goal (collective good). On the basis of such a 
cost-benefit calculation, participation in the protest activities of social 
movements can be made plausible also to those citizens for whom the collective 
good that is the goal of the protest activities has lower priority than particular 
goods (such as economic group interests). 
Over the past two decades the social movements have in fact presented them-
selves as movements representing certain interests that we have referred to as 
collective goods. As a rule, this type of interest been regarded as determinative 
for the new social movements, which for this reason among others have been 
classified as 'new'. A further characteristic of the new social movements was 
(and is) the limited participation of a considerable number of citizens in protest 
actions to articulate these interests. These protest actions are made possible by 
the infrastructure of modern societies, such as the mass media-related 
possibility of rapid and far-reaching dissemination of information and the 
possibility of rapidly overcoming geographical distance with the aid of 
transport systems. This structure of possibilities provided by modern society is 
in principle also available for the articulation of quite different interests. In this 
sense social movements can be regarded as a specifically modern form of 
interest group formation and interest articulation. From the point of view of the 
individual, two fundamental problems can be solved in this manner, which in 
their turn are the consequence of modernization processes. First the problem of 
the scarcity of time (which results from, among other things, the oversupply of 
options for action available to individuals in their leisure time), and second the 
problem of desire to participate. In protest actions the individual can assume a 
certain political role for a limited period, thus solving both problems. From the 
perspective of the actors of the polity, however, an increase in this form of 
citizens' organization would further increase contingency in the public system. 
This is all the more true because such interest groups can also form at the 63 
output end of the democratic process, for example to block certain implemented 
decisions. 
On the basis of its individual members, the collectivity of citizens is in a 
position neither to identify the interests of the collectivity (as interests of the 
overall collectivity or as interests of sub-collectivities), nor to transform these 
into collective action. Within the framework of our metatheory, interest groups 
and the mass media have been regarded as differentiated from the collectivity 
of citizens that assume this function, and thus contribute to the formation of the 
collectivity of citizens. The mass media and the interest groups have hitherto -
so as not to complicate the analysis at this stage - been described as collective 
actors. In fact, however, they are configurations of individual collective actors 
of the same type, and these configurations in their turn form a subsystem 'mass 
media' and a subsystem 'interest groups'. The structure of these subsystems of 
the subsystem 'public' is also characteristic of the structure of the public system 
itself. Our metatheory will not undertake to explicate this assertion. However, 
another structural aspect of the public system is of direct significance in the 
context of our argument, which relates a possible increase in contingency in the 
public system (mentioned in connection with social movements) to the interest 
associations as well. 
Within the framework of the ongoing modernization of modern societies, the 
political parties in most Western democracies have more or less transformed 
themselves into broadly based so-called 'catchall parties', thus permitting the 
differentiation of the party system that can perform the mediation function 
between the public system and the governmental system. In effect, this 
transformation of the political parties means a considerable degree of delinking 
from certain social groups. While this delinking makes it possible to react 
flexibly to public demands, change on the part of the public is the precondition 
for this transformation of the parties. The public system as the collectivity of 
citizens has undergone differentiation, so that the traditional simple cleavage 
structure on the basis of which the party system was originally constituted has 
lost its contours. Authors such as Beck (1986) take this differentiation thesis so 
far that they posit a dissolution of the social forms and social milieux of modern 64 
industrial society, and the consequent liberation of the individual. According to 
Beck (1986,122 et seq.), the outcome is an individualization and diversification 
of life situations. This would also mean that a delinking of interest associations 
and citizens occurs within the public system. The interest associations would 
then relate less to definable and stable social groups and more to permanent 
organizations for the representation of interests (in the case of interest 
associations), which have constantly to seek their own clientele (see also Streeck 
1987). The constituent relationship would then be reversed. It would not be 
existing, permanent social groups that constitute interest associations but 
existing, permanent interest associations that constitute a changing clientele of 
varying dimensions, the group nature of which consists solely in the limited 
and specific community of interest. We do not intend to establish how far this 
individualization process has actually advanced. But the trend seems to 
indicate that it involves both the differentiation and destructuring of the public 
system. Such a simultaneous process of differentiation and destructuring of the 
public system would necessarily make the action of collective actors of the 
polity more difficult. This would then have to take place under conditions of a 
high degree of public system contingency both at the output end and at the 
input end of the democratic process. However, this conclusion holds true only 
if these processes of differentiation and destructuring have in fact taken place 
and have reached an advanced stage. In this regard far more theoretical 
attempts have been made to demonstrate the plausibility of this thesis than 
empirical proof has been furnished
47. 
47 On the question of the structuredness of the public system and the relationship between the 
public system and the party system, a number of empirical analyses within the scope of the 
concept of political cleavage structures have been produced (e.g., Fuchs 1991a; Wessels 1991, 
1993; Gerhards 1993). 65 
4.3 Generalized Action Orientations 
4.3.1 Generalized Action Orientations in the Political System as a Whole 
In discussing the action theory paradigm, the most important criticism of this 
paradigm was summarized under the heading 'lack of system reference' (see 
Chapter 3). The lack of system reference was seen primarily in the failure to 
take generalized action orientations into consideration. Generalized action 
orientations are, in addition to role structures, one of the levels of meaning of 
which social systems become differentiated from their societal environment. 
From an action theory perspective, these generalized action orientations form 
the common and stable meaning of the action performed by actors within the 
system. The actor's options for action, among which they must exercise their 
choice (their specific action orientation), are available only within the 
framework of such generalized action orientations. Although they are implicitly 
addressed in action theory with the concept of 'constraints', in action analyses 
they are in effect tacitly taken for granted. According to Schimank (1988a, 623) 
full explanation of actions must thus 'always take place in two phases. In the 
sense of the rational pursuit of interests, actors select actions within the 
framework of these conditioning generalized action orientations'. Schimank 
consequently asks how these generalized action orientations are to be 
determined and answers by positing categories with the aid of which this can 
be done
48. The most important theoretical work on the issue of generalized 
action orientations has been presented under the heading of symbolically 
generalized exchange media or communication media by Parsons (1969, 352-
472), and further developed by Luhmann (1975a, 1975b). These are the principal 
theoretical approaches we shall be addressing. 
The social system that interests us is the political system. The first question to 
be settled in this regard is that of a generalized action orientation valid for the 
political system as a whole i.e., for all actors wishing to act politically. We have 
attempted to determine the general meaning of political action with regard to 
48 Schimank (1988b) implements these proposals with regard to sport as a societal subsystem. 66 
the function of the political system, namely in the production of collectively 
binding decisions (see Chapter 4). The precondition for performance of this 
function is the generation of sufficient power. The basis of the generation of 
(political) power is the monopoly on the exercise thereof, and the consequent 
possibility of enforcing the binding effect of the decisions made by the use of 
coercion should the need arise. In the theories of Parsons and Luhmann we 
have mentioned, power is also described as the generalized action orientation 
of the political system in the sense of the generating, acquiring, and exercising 
power. In his later analyses, however, Luhmann (1986, 167-182) goes still 
further, taking even the institutionalized organization of the power process into 
account to a certain extent. In differentiated political systems, the collectively 
binding decisions are made in specialized posts endowed with the 
corresponding competence to do so, which the political parties compete with 
one another to occupy. The generalized action orientation in the political system 
is thus directed towards occupying such decision-making positions. For this 
reason Luhmann (1986,170) regards the code of government and opposition as 
the uniform code of politics as a whole. He chooses the term code to indicate 
that only two values are involved, interdependent and excluding a third option. 
Only if one adopts the code of government and opposition as generalized action 
orientation
4
9 does one act in the political system i.e., does one generate 
resonance and not mere noise. 
One of the criteria for a generalized action orientation that corresponds to a 
developed political system, and which makes the latter possible in the first 
place, is its openness to variety, variability and contradiction on more concrete 
levels of meaning. This is realized by the code being delinked from 
programmes (Luhmann 1986, 171). This delinking means that occupation of 
decision-making positions can no longer be tied to the attainment of quite 
specific goals. Filling government posts via elections serves to reconcile the 
general code with a specific programme for the duration of the legislative 
49 In the sense of metatheoretical presupposition, it is assumed that all actors are aware of this 
code. Awareness does not necessarily mean having a fully conscious grasp of the code. It can 
also be diffuse background awareness that is nevertheless action oriented. 67 
period. Filling government positions alone does not yet constitute decision-
making action. One must also know how to exercise political power, and this is 
formulated in the form of platforms. The essential point is that the linkage of 
code and programme is limited in time, is subject to constant scrutiny during 
the legislative period, and is put out to tender at the next election. Within the 
framework of the democratic process there is continual communication on the 
appropriateness of this fundamentally limited and rescindable linkage between 
occupation of government positions and a given platform. Such communication 
presupposes comparative points of view and evaluation criteria. Luhmann 
(1986,174) assumes that for this purpose complex political systems develop so-
called 'secondary coding' of the government / opposition code, which controls 
the critical communication of government action in relation to opposition 
alternatives. If these codes shall have the status of durable and generalized 
action orientations, the current government and opposition programmes cannot 
be compared only on the basis of the programmes themselves. Luhmann varies 
his examples of such secondary coding that provides durable and generalized 
points of view from which to evaluate changing programmes. Originally he 
proposed the code of progressive and conservative (Luhmann 1981b), but in 
later analyses he prefers the codes restrictive/expansive (in relation to state 
activities) and ecological/economic. This vacillation seems to indicate that the 
hypothesis of such secondary coding is more difficult to sustain in the face of 
empirical reality than is the case with primary coding. Luhmann's examples 
show in positing such codes he has been overtaken by actual developments. A 
generalized action orientation fulfilling the function of secondary coding 
advanced by Luhmann must apparently be still more general than the examples 
he has proposed. At least in the liberal democracies of western Europe, a 
possible alternative is the left/right code or left/right schema
50. 
This postulate was investigated in two analyses (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; 
Fuchs and Kuhnel 1990). Empirical evidence was furnished that the left/right 
schema meets the theoretical criteria Luhmann sets for a political code. The 
50 The functional equivalent in the USA of the European left/right code is generally claimed to 
be the code of liberal/conservative (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). 68 
left/right schema as such is a spatial archetype that will accept a variety of 
content. Within its scope of meaning it is thus capable of reacting to almost 
every sort of societal change. The schema's current scope of meaning is 
structurally characterized by a restricted repertoire of generalized elements binary 
in nature
51. Due to these properties of the left/right meaning scope, actors 
using the schema in communicating can mean different things, but the 
differences are still so interrelated that communication can succeed despite the 
divergence. If the left/right schema is projected on to the government/ 
opposition code, an asymmetrical perspective is established. The government is 
either left-wing with a right-wing opposition, or the government is right-wing 
with a left-wing opposition. And a first control on assessment of government 
and opposition action is provided by whether an actors regards himself as 
being to the left or to the right. In this sense the left /right schema constitutes a 
generalized action orientation that prestructures actors' choices. 
Although the vast majority of citizens are familiar with the left/right schema, 
and despite the common use of the schema in political communication, this 
generalized action orientation has been less of a constituent element in the 
political system of liberal democracies than has the government/opposition 
code. It is not a necessary condition for generating resonance in the political 
system and ensuring continued communication. The left/right schema is 
accordingly not used by all actors in the political system, nor is it used in all 
situations by those that do so. The left/right schema can thus be regarded as one 
generalized action orientation of the political system, but not as the generalized 
action orientation that defines a common and stable meaning for action 
accepted by all actors of the political system. 
51 At this point we cannot go into any more detail about what this means. See the two cited 
analyses. It is these structural properties of the left/right schema's complex of meaning that 
make it suitable for a political code. 69 
4.3.2 Generalized Action Orientations in the Three Subsystems 
The generalized action orientation of actors in the political system as a whole 
has been defined as orientation towards occupying decision-making positions. 
Since in liberal democracies this takes place within the institutional framework 
of competition between parties, a more precise definition has been advanced in 
the form of the government/opposition code. This code exists as background 
knowledge of political system actors on what action within this system is 
basically about. This definition of the generalized action orientation of the 
political system brings us back to the argument that the differentiation of social 
systems proceeds by means of a mutual process of influencing and restricting 
structural differentiation (at the role level) and the differentiation of a 
generalized action meaning (see Chapter 4.1). Even if generalized action 
orientation is by its nature at a more general level of meaning than are role 
structures, relative structural dominance can be posited for the constitutive 
process of both levels of meaning. There are two reasons for this. The 
distinctness of role acting facilitates the identification of more general levels of 
meaning (cognitive dimension), and role acting is rendered relatively strongly 
binding by legal formalization (normative dimension). In defining the 
generalized action orientations of the three political system subsystems, we take 
this relative structural dominance as our starting point. 
The democratic process has been construed as a directed sequence of action 
products. These action products are principally generated in exchange 
processes between the polity and the public system. The dominant structural 
elements that make these exchange processes meaningful in the first place are 
the right of the collective actors of the governmental system to make binding 
decisions for the purpose of realizing collective goals, and the right of the 
collective actors of the public system to formulate these collective goals. Both 
are transmitted by the franchise i.e., by the citizens selecting political parties at 
periodic elections to occupy decision-making positions. A political party is able 
to implement its platform only if it is elected, and the citizens can expect their 
demands to be met only if the parties they favour occupy the decision-making 
positions. From this point of view it is plausible to regard government/ 70 
opposition as a code that represents the generalized action orientation of the 
actors in the political system. For the purpose of describing the exchange 
processes that take place between the polity and the public system, this code is, 
however, still too general. In accordance with the model of the democratic 
process (Figure 2), this exchange process has an input dimension and an output 
dimension. At the input end it takes place in the interaction between the 
political parties and the actors in the public system. Public system actors seek 
the greatest possible responsiveness on the part of the political parties towards 
their demands, and in exchange offer support in the form of votes. Vice versa, 
the political parties want the greatest possible support from citizens and in 
exchange provide the corresponding responsiveness towards the demands of 
the citizens (for example by taking these demands into account in electoral and 
party platforms). The concept of support is to be preferred to that of vote 
maximization because maximizing the vote is not necessarily a rational strategy 
for all parties. In the interest of occupying decision-making positions it can also 
be rational to seek the support of quite specific segments of the electorate so as 
to ensure inclusion in the government coalition
5
2 (the Free Democratic Party in 
Germany provides an example of a party pursuing this type of rational 
strategy). 
At the output end, the exchange process between the polity and the public 
system takes place in the interaction between the actors of the governmental 
system and those of the public system. This is, however, somewhat more 
complicated than at the input end. The governmental system actors primarily 
seek acceptance of implemented decisions by the actors of the public system. 
We have already mentioned that this acceptance is a variable factor and can no 
longer be conceived of as acceptance without motive. The governmental system 
can offer more or less effective realizations of the demands articulated at the 
input end. But the problem is that effectiveness can only become apparent in the 
outcomes, whereas approval of the implemented decisions precedes the 
52 Another reason why we prefer the concept of support is because it is broader. Support (or 
the opposite) is expressed not only through exercise of the franchise but also in other forms 
of political participation. 71 
possibility of achieving such outcomes. The actors of the governmental system 
must therefore first convince the actors of the public system that the 
implemented decisions could be effective. On this basis the actors of the public 
system can then decide whether the implemented decisions are to be regarded 
as appropriate in relation to the demands they have articulated. Approval of 
implemented decisions depends largely on this interpretation, which influences 
the outcomes of the governmental system's decision making and thus its actual 
effectiveness. 
We have thus established the generalized action orientations of the three poli-
tical system subsystems, distinguishing two generalized action orientations for 
the public system. These are responsiveness (public system at the input end), 
support (intermediation system), effectiveness (governmental system), and 
appropriateness (public system at the output end). Each represents the action 
meaning shared by the collective actors in the individual subsystems within 
which these actors make their choices for concrete action. These postulated 
generalized action orientations possess a certain degree of theoretical and 
intuitive plausibility, but require confirmation by empirical analysis. If they are 
indeed significant in controlling action, even if in generalized form, then 
empirical verification will in principle be possible. Regardless of the results of 
such empirical measurement, a connection can be postulated on the basis of the 
meta-theoretical reflections we have advanced so far. The more clearly a 
generalized action orientation of a (sub-)system can be identified, and the more 
clearly it can be distinguished from the generalized action orientations of other 
(sub-)systems, the more markedly will this system have become established a 
discrete and relatively autonomous system. 
4.4 Variations on the Process Model 
The model of the democratic process we have been discussing construes this 
process primarily as a formal one. We define formal as laid down by the 
constitution or, in Luhmann's words, 'supported by the official power 
structure'. A further, less explicit point of reference of the model construct is 72 
provided by assumptions that are hot covered by formal structure. The formal 
structure of representative democracies does not as such lay down that citizens' 
demands are to reach the government solely via the mediation of the political 
parties, nor does it determine what we have called motiveless acceptance. In 
liberal theories of democracy such definitions are introduced additionally as 
prescriptive postulates (on liberal theories of democracy see Barber 1984, Held 
1987, Hirst 1990). We believe that Luhmann's theory of the political system also 
returns to the prescriptive postulates of liberal democratic theory. However, he 
links them with the assumption that these postulates are a prerequisite for 
exercising functions of the political system in complex societies. We need not 
discuss this problem further at this point. What should be noted at this stage is 
that two deviations from the prescriptively interpreted description of the 
process have already been introduced into the model we have so far presented. 
The introduction of these deviations occurs on the basis of empirically 
observable facts. We are referring to the conditional acceptance of the 
implemented decisions by the public system at the output boundary of the 
democratic process, and to the articulation of demands by the public system 
that by-passes the political parties as the differentiated intermediary actors. This 
articulation has two variations. Lobbying by the interest associations and pro-
test action by the social movements. Although the two variations are not 
necessarily compatible with the idea of representation, they are not excluded by 
the formal structure of representative democracies. For this reason, at least the 
second variation can be interpreted as a radicalization of the democratic 
principle, which is both legal and legitimate in representative democracies. 
What consequences this radicalization has for the quality of the democratic 
process is another matter. 
A further variation on the formal democratic process has already been men-
tioned in passing, although not dealt with systematically, when we discussed 
the collective actors of the public system. It was assumed that the interest 
groups and the mass media not only articulate but also generate the interests 
and demands of citizens. Let us examine and generalize this aspect. The 
exchange processes between the collective actors occur under conditions of 73 
double contingency i.e., neither of the parties to the interaction knows what can 
be expected of the other. For the political parties, for example, there are no 
reliable indications of what the voter really wants and for the voter there are no 
longer any reliable indications of what the parties really want to do or could do 
if they were in power. But since what any actor does depends on anticipating 
what his partner in the interaction does, this produces a highly contingent 
constellation. Nor do the generalized action orientations we have described 
eliminate this, since they constrain concrete options for action only within a 
very broad context. According to Luhmann (1970, 165; 1987, 148), this 
constellation gives rise to an unofficial counterprocess of communication, 
which can be understood as dealing with the contingency problem. 
One possibility of conceptualizing the official and unofficial communication 
processes is, as we have mentioned above, to draw a distinction between a 
power process and influence process. Each process in its own way regulates the 
transmission of selections made by one actor for another. The logic of the power 
process has already been described. The formal structure (in this case the 
constitution) determines who is to take over what selections from whom. 
Deviations from this determination are subject to legal sanctions. The motive 
for acceptance of selections is thus primarily to avoid the imposition of 
sanctions. The transmission of selections in the counterprocess must necessarily 
operate with different motives for acceptance. 
Transmission of selections on the basis of influence cannot rely on legal sanc-
tions (with the potential use of coercion), but only on persuasion. Parsons (1969, 
415) correspondingly defines influence as 'a means of persuasion' (see also Luh-
mann 1975, 74 et seq.). The willingness of actors in the democratic process to be 
persuaded to assume the selections of an actor downstream from them in the 
formal process depends on the opportunity this affords for reducing 
contingency. The administrative authorities allow themselves to be influenced 
by the interest associations because this improves the chances of the 
implemented decisions being accepted. The government allows itself to be 
influenced by the administrative authorities, because this increases the 
probability of the decisions made being put into effect. The (government) 74 
parties allow themselves to be irifluenced by the government because this 
increases the chances that the public wi.ll he offered viable programmes. This 
contrary chain of influence seems perfectly plausible from the perspective of 
rationally acting actors of the polity. But what motivates citizens to accept the 
selections made by the political parties, if the citizens are themselves both the 
point of departure and the destination of the democratic process, and thus have 
only themselves as reference point for their action
53? One of the problems that 
generate contingency for the citizens is that - with some exaggeration - they do 
not know what they ought concretely to want. The latitude for the demands 
that citizens as members of a modern society may address to the polity is highly 
overdetermined. The greater the extent to which traditional social structures 
decay and the individualization of life situations progresses, the more 
pronounced this over determination becomes. This also ek'minates the 
boundaries between possible interests and demands that are unambiguously 
attributable to specific social groups. The motivation for citizens to accept the 
attempts to influence the formulation of their demands undertaken by political 
parties (and by interest groups and the mass media) lies in the reduction of this 
contingency. In this sense attempts to exercise influence may be not only 
accepted but possibly even desired. The citizens' expectation that political 
parties will offer clear programmes and alternatives can be seen as an 
expression of this desire. The chances of collective actors to influence the 
citizens depend on qualities perceived in and attributed to these actors, such as 
reputation, reliability, integrity etc. 
The variations on the formal or official democratic process we have described 
involved first skipping single stages in the process, and second to unofficial, 
that is to say counter-process. A third variation resulted from the necessity for 
taking systematic note of expert knowledge to increase the efficiency of one's 
own action for the purposes of optimizing the means to attain certain goals. The 
type of expert knowledge that is relevant depends on the subsystem within 
53 Choosing an option for action and neglecting another does not have the same consequences 
for the citizens and for the actors of the polity, whose actions always entail the risk of losing 
the decision-making positions or of not gaining them in the first place. 75 
which the respective actor is acting and on the generalized action orientation 
that is characteristic of this subsystem. If the generalized action orientation of 
the political parties is to maximize support, the political parties will necessarily 
develop a need for instrumental knowledge on generating support. This could 
be one of the main reasons why practically all the larger political parties in the 
liberal democracies follow the results of polls or even establish within their 
formal structures the corresponding sections for producing such knowledge. 
Other types of expert knowledge are needed for the most effective possible 
implementation of the governing parties' programmatic goals. This relates to 
the possibilities for action and the consequences of action in the areas of society 
affected by the respective goal. This expert knowledge reaches the 
governmental system primarily through the permanent communication 
between government department bureaucracies and the relevant experts. 
Experts outside the political system thus constitute a factor in influencing all the 
action products of the democratic process. The mechanism that ensures this 
influence is founded not in a formal structural element of the political system 
but in the attempt to act as efficiently as possible, the point of reference for 
efficiency naturally differing from actor to actor in the political system. If we 
were to attempt to integrate this influence of experts into the graphic model of 
the democratic process (see Figure 2), we would have to direct a horizontal 
arrow towards the vertically aligned action products coming from the areas of 
the societal environment of the political system in which the relevant expert 
knowledge is produced. 76 
5. A Concept of Political Structures 
5.1 The Structure Concept of David Easton 
The model of the democratic process describes this process as a directed 
sequence of specific action products of specific actors. At the empirical level the 
individual action products and the relations between them are variable factors. 
An example: what demands are formulated, how they are formulated, and how 
they influence decisions (made by governmental system actors) depend on the 
choices made by the relevant actors in action situations. But the actors' choices 
are subject to constraints that limit the latitude for choice. A complete 
explanation of concrete actions (and thus of action products) and of action 
concatenation must therefore include both the constraints and the actors' 
rational calculation. We have already mentioned the structure of social systems 
as constituting the most important of these constraints, and given some 
indication of what is meant by the term. We will now deal more systematically 
with the concept of political structures. We will be discussing what is to be 
understood in general by political structures, and will not analysing concrete 
structures. For this reason we will not take more recent empirical studies as our 
point of departure, which deal with the structural characteristics of democracies 
with the aim of classifying individual democracies on an empirical basis or of 
explaining the divergence in performance of these democracies (see inter alios 
Powell 1982, 1987; Lijphart 1984, 1989; Weil 1989; Lane and Ersson 1991). The 
emphasis of these studies is, however, more on empirical analysis than on 
discussion of a concept of structure on the basis of which empirical structural 
characteristics could be determined. Easton's statement (1990, 3, 19 et seq.) that 
the concept of structure is one that has been neglected in political science is in 
tune with this assessment. Easton himself develops a concept of political 
structures in a detailed theoretical analysis, which provides us with our starting 
point. 
The most general meaning of structure, already indicated in the colloquial use 
of the term, is a certain ordering of elements that has a degree of stability in the 77 
time dimension. The most important characteristic of such an order is that not 
all possible relations between the elements are permitted, but only a limited 
number. It is precisely this limitation that produces structure. If we are dealing 
with political structures, the first question is what the specific elements are that 
constitute them. For the differentiated political systems with which the 
metatheory is concerned, this question has already been answered. According 
to Luhmann (1970, 155) it is different types of role linkages that constitute the 
different political structures. Roles are accordingly the smallest structural 
elements in political systems. This assumption is shared by Almond and Powell 
(1978, 12, 52) and to a certain extent by Easton (1990, 74a). Parsons (1971) sees 
the role in general as the basic category for all social systems. Roles can be 
defined as relatively consistent aggregations of generalized expectations 
relating to a social position and linked to the demand that the individuals who 
occupy the position abide by these expectations (Wiswede 1973, 18, 38). This 
definition of role contains both a normative component and a behavioural 
component, and it is frequently unclear whether the structure concept refers to 
only one of the two components or to both at the same time. In this respect 
Easton makes two clear decisions. He distinguishes between cultural structures 
and behavioural structures and allocates social structures as interactional 
structures exclusively to the behavioural level (Easton 1990, 51, 67, 74 et seq., 
260). He sees the relation between the cultural level and the behavioural level as 
a causal one i.e., the role norms are independent variables that help to explain 
role action (Easton 1990, 74). These theoretical decisions are plausible, but we 
do not intend to follow them entirely. Before we can justify this, we have still to 
deal with a further fundamental distinction made by Easton, that between 
formal and informal structures. 
The difference between the two forms of structure is in the degree of expli-
citness with which they are introduced and made transparent for participants 
and affected parties. In modern societies this explicitness of formal structures is 
achieved above all by means of binding written rules (Easton 1990, 66, et seq.). 
Legal norms have the highest degree of formalization, since on the one hand 
they lay down the behavioural expectations and on the other the sanctions to be 78 
imposed in the event of these expectations being contravened. The expectations 
themselves are endowed with greater stability by the concomitant expectation 
of sanctions in the event of contravention (Luhmann 1984, 436). This stabilizing 
effect would have to increase in proportion to the threat of sanctions. This is 
one of the reasons why Giddens (1984, 22) introduces the criterion strong 
sanctioning/weak sanctioning as a defining characteristic of social structures. 
Thus the degree to which sanctions are to be expected and the severity of 
sanctions to be imposed when rules are broken can, together with the degree of 
explicitness, be regarded as criteria for distinguishing formal from informal 
structures. The distinction between formal and informal structures can also 
apply to structural arrangements in premodern societies. Easton (1990, 66, 81) 
considers the ritual or ceremonial introduction of behavioural expectations to 
be functionally equivalent to the written legal norms of modern societies. There 
are thus formal structures to be discovered in all societies and not only in 
modern societies. In contrast to formal structures, informal ones are less 
explicit, involve less well-defined consequences in the event of rules being 
contravened, and are usually (but not always) subject to weaker sanctioning. 
Formulated in positive terms, Easton (1990, 81, 96) refers to informal structures 
as conventions and customs or as established rules of behaviour. The 
distinction between formal and informal structures has so far been described 
with reference to rules and norms
54, and thus, according to Easton (1990, 67), 
on a cultural level. But Easton also applies this difference to interaction 
structures i.e., to the behavioural level, by which he means the actual behaviour 
of actors. By crossing Easton's two analytical distinctions of formal /informal 
and cultural level/behavioural level, we obtain four categories of political 
structure
55. 
54 The concept of rule is somewhat broader in meaning than that of norm, which is more 
closely associated with the criterion of sanctioning (on the rule concept see Crozier and 
Friedberg 1980, 52; Giddens 1984,17 et seq.; Easton 1990, 64, 67 et seq.). 
55 The structure categories distinguished in this typology all refer to lower-order structures. 
These are distinguished from higher-order structures by, among other things, the criterion of 
observability (Easton 1990,241,244 et seq., 260,266). 79 
Figure 5: Categories of Structure (Easton) 
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We note that Easton (1990, 55, 60) sees social structures and thus political 
structures as stable interaction patterns between actors. Central to Easton's 
structure concept is, moreover, that these interaction patterns refer exclusively 
to actual behaviour. Expectations and norms of behaviour are accordingly 
assigned to the cultural level, and in the case of formal structures are referred to 
as formal rule structures (Easton 1990, 95). Formal political structures are thus 
defined as formal empirical structures. Easton elaborates his concept of formal 
rule structures with great precision. The meaning of formal empirical 
structures, by contrast, is less clear. What, for example, is the nature of the 
formal on the behavioural level? Easton's (1990, 68 et seq., 103 et seq.) solution 
to this problem is to establish formal structures at the behavioural level, where 
behavioural structure corresponds to structure on the cultural level. But this 
means that the formal cannot be defined at the observational level alone but 
only by subsequent comparison of the empirically ascertained interaction 
pattern with the formal rule structures. Easton's solution thus implies that the 
formal empirical structure cannot be defined in isolation from the formal rule 
structure. We feel that the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between the 
two types of formal structure invites the fundamental question whether 
political structures can be localized at the behavioural level. Is it conceptually 
possible to distinguish with sufficient clarity solely at the behavioural level 
between the actual actions performed by actors and the constraints (structures) 
for these actions? If structures are seen as being constraints on action, then the 
preliminary selection of actions permitted under these constraints cannot occur at 80 
the level of the acts themselves, but only at that of expectations of action 
(Luhmann 1976, 121; 1984, 73, 140). Ariel in Easton's terminology, this means at 
the level of rule structures. Empirical structures thus arise and can thus be 
observed because there are rule structures. In relation to Easton's categories of 
structure shown in Figure 5, we therefore understand political structures 
primarily as rule structures and secondarily as empirical structures. This 
applies with respect to both formal structures and informal structures. The 
empirical level is defined as the acting of actors in situations, and the extent to 
which rule structures determine this action is an empirical issue. In so far as 
they do so, patterns can be observed in the actual interactions between actors, 
and these patterns (empirical structures) in their turn permit conclusions to be 
drawn with regard to the latent rule structures. 
Figure 6: A Model of Action Structure and Current Action 
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In Chapter 3 we dealt with the circumstance that structural constraints never 
fully determine the actor's action, but do so only to a greater or lesser degree, 
and that there are always margins of liberty for the actor. The actors' taking 
advantage of these margins of liberty is structurally relevant only to a certain 
extent. Not all aspects of action relate to norms and rules i.e, they are not even 
taken into account by the latter. They are thus structurally neutral. Other 
aspects of concrete action, by contrast, clearly relate to norms and rules, and are 
consequently linked to the demand that these norms and rules be respected 
when acting. When this actually happens, one can speak of reproduction of the 81 
structure (see Figure 6). The observable forms in which this reproduction is 
manifested are Easton's interaction patterns or empirical structures. The 
structure is transformed in proportion to the contravention of prescriptive 
expectations. This transformation can mean either that a given structure is 
dismantled, or that it is restructured. A causal relationship is assumed to exist 
between formal and informal structures. Informal structures form around 
formal structures, which constitute the core of the structure and restrict the 
development of informal structures. 
5.2 Structures as Generalized and Complementary Behavioural 
Expectations 
If we adopt Easton's terminology, political structures in our metatheory will be 
described as formal and informal rule structures. Rules refer not to actual beha-
viour but to behavioural expectations. The latter concept ought more precisely 
to be termed generalized and complementary behavioural expectations. This provides 
us with a broader concept covering both the forms of constraint on action we 
have been discussing, generalized action orientations and role structures
56. The 
generalization of behavioural expectations limits potential action space 
(Luhmann 1984, 397). Generalized behavioural expectations preselect the 
actions admissible in the system, what can typically be expected of parties to an 
interaction. Complementarity means that these behavioural expectations 
interrelate. Complementarity has two aspects. In the case of generalized action 
orientations it refers to identical behavioural expectations
5
7 (each party to an 
interaction expects the other to have the same action orientations), and in the 
case of roles it can refer to different expectations (which are nevertheless 
complementary). Role acting does not as a rule take place in isolation, but in a 
56 The terms role structures, rule structures and action structures are largely synonymous. 
57 On the basis of the generalized action orientations discussed in the metatheory, this would, 
for example, mean that all actors in the political system can count on all others acting in con-
formity with the government/opposition code, and that all actors in the intermediation 
system have the support of the public as their generalized action orientation, and expect that 
the same applies to the others. 82 
complex of differing but interrelated roles.. With respect to generalization, 
Luhmann (1970, 121; 1984, 140.) distinguishes three dimensions, material, time 
and social generalization. Material generalization refers to the complementary 
expectations of parties to an interaction on how to act. Time generalization refers 
to the permanence and reliability of the complementary behavioural 
expectations. This permanence and reliability is generated above all by 
standardisation, the setting of norms (contra-factually stabilized behavioural 
expectations). In modern societies norms are usually set primarily by law and 
by the sanctions law imposes if expectations are not abided by. Social 
generalization refers to the assumption that actual and potential interaction 
partners agree on complementary behavioural expectations. According to 
Luhmann (1970, 122) every social system needs a certain degree of congruent 
generalization in all three dimensions. In other words, durable complementary 
behavioural expectations with a high level of presumed consensus are 
required
58. They form the core of social structure. In modern political systems 
this core in determined by the role structures laid down by law. To a large 
extent we accept Luhmann's definition of social structures, but reject social 
generalization as a defining element. If the presumption of consensus or actual 
consensus is already taken as a defining characteristic of social structures, then 
we believe it impossible to show how reproduction or transformation of these 
structures can occur. This reproduction or transformation is essentially 
determined by the degree of consensus or support that the actors concerned 
give these structures. 
We thus understand the formal structure of the political system of liberal 
democracies to be the generalized and complementary behavioural 
expectations of the relevant actors as defined by law
59. The complementarity of 
behavioural expectations operates on two levels. On the level of the distinct 
58 Institutions can be understood as examples of such congruent generalizations. Gohler (1987, 
1990) also argues in this direction. But since the concept of institution has associations going 
far beyond this (see Easton 1990, 58 et seq.), it has no clearly definable analytical status in 
our systems theory context. 
59 This definition covers both the material determination of behavioural expectations and 
determination of the consequences of contravening expectations. 83 
roles, the linkage of which forms the structure of collective actors, and on the 
level of collective actors, the linkage of which forms the structure of the political 
system. Informal structure consists of patterns of generalized and 
complementary behavioural expectations that develop on the basis of habit (for 
example on the basis of conventions and customs). These formal and informal 
structures are the most important and direct constraints on the actors' action in 
the political system. To a large extent they determine what goal attainment 
options are open to actors in the first place. To a certain degree they thus 
determine their choices in action situations. In addition to structures, we have 
discussed the generalized action orientations of actors as constraints on their 
action. Such action orientations were defined as stable, shared orientations of 
actors in a system, which thus also constitute generalized and complementary 
behavioural expectations. 







Whereas role structures imply the complementarity of differing behavioural 
expectations
60, generalized action orientations refer to the complementarity of 
identical behavioural expectations of all actors (see the example in Footnote 57). 
They are thus generalized behavioural expectations at different levels of 
generalization. The metatheory of the democratic process is intended to provide 
the theoretical groundwork for explaining the actual action of political system 
actors. From this point of reference a continuum can be posited between 




60 Between different roles and different collective actors. 84 
can be divided into at least three theoretically relevant sections. The lowest 
level is that of the distinct actors (individual pr collective) who wish tQ attain 
their respective goals by acting in concrete situations. The next level is that of 
role structures, which typically prescribe how actors are to act and generate 
expectations on how others will act. This limits actors' specific action 
orientations and allows them to relate to one another. The topmost level is 
formed by the generalized action orientations of all actors in the system. Social 
systems are formed by both levels of generalized and complementary 
expectations, by role structures and by generalized action orientations. 
As far as the structures of the political system are concerned, various structural 
levels can be distinguished, which following Easton (1990, 270) can be 
described as a hierarchy of political structures (see Figure 8). The structure 
concept we propose can apply to all social systems and to the diverse 
hierarchical levels of their structural differentiation. The political system is a 
social system constituting one of the primary societal subsystems. The highest 
level in the hierarchy is society, the most comprehensive social system, differen-
tiated into diverse primary subsystems, the one that interests us being the 
political system. In our metatheory of the democratic process, the political 
system differentiates into three subsystems, the public system, the 
intermediation system and the governmental system. From certain analytical 
points of view, the intermediation system and the governmental system can be 
taken together under the heading polity. Each of the three subsystems of the 
political system differentiates into specific collective actors, and these in their 
turn into distinct roles. Roles form the lowest level in the hierarchy of political 
structures, and can therefore be described as the base elements of these 
structures. Starting from this lowest level, each successive level represents 
increasingly complex configurations of role networks. The increasing 
complexity is, however, not a mere aggregation of more and more roles. The 
structural units of each successive level are quite specific linkages of structural 
units from the respective preceding level. Among other things, this postulate 
implies that the structure of a political system does not have to be determined 
concretely by displaying the entire complexity of role linkages in the political 85 86 
system, but merely by defining the specific configuration of the three 
subsystems of the political system. The same logic would have to be applied in 
determining the structures of lower hierarchical levels. The governmental 
system, for example, could be defined as a specific configuration of 
government, parliament and administration. In the context of his theory of 
political structures, Easton (1990, 270 et seq.) speaks of much the same thing as 
a 'nesting hierarchy' of structures
61. 
Within the hierarchy of political structures, we must return to an important 
analytical differentiation we have already addressed in drawing a distinction 
between social systems determining action and social systems capable of 
acting
62. Social systems capable of action are those that are capable of 
intentional action at least in a broader sense of the term. In the hierarchy of 
political structures this applies only to levels relating to distinct roles and to 
collective actors, and, for example, not to the level of the subsystems of the 
political system. Only the governmental system could under certain conditions 
be understood as a collective actor. If there is a clear enough majority in 
parliament to provide the government with considerable autonomy of action, 
the government constitutes something like the vertex of the entire subsystem 
(governmental system), the final instance to which the binding decisions of the 
system can be attributed as intentional action products. Regardless of what in 
particular can be considered a collective actor and thus a social system capable 
of acting, it is by definition clear that manifest interaction patterns and latent 
behavioural expectations can be observed and measured only in this category of 
social system. This does not make it any easier to define the structures of social 
systems determining action or of higher-order structures. Higher-order 
structures then have to be analytically reconstructed from the lower-order 
structures. At all events it seems to us necessary to determine in concrete terms 
what can be understood as structural characteristics at these levels before 
61 However, the aspect that is emphasized in this 'nesting hierarchy' is that the higher 
structural units determine the operational modes of the lower structural units. 
62 The same matter is addressed by Easton (1990, 241-279) in his distinction between higher-
order structures and lower-order structures. 87 
applying data reduction procedures to a set of structure indicators and 
allocating the resultant dimensions to higher system levels. It is only then that a 
meaningful selection of indicators can be made, and only then that the results of 
such data reduction can meaningfully be interpreted in theoretical terms. But 
the theoretical determination of concrete structures and of the ensuing 
empirical analysis is not the object of the metatheory under discussion. 
Having explicated the structure concept, we must now differentiate the 
structure concept we had been using prior to the explication. The structure of a 
social system has been hitherto taken to mean the networking of the collective 
actors belonging to the given system. Two different aspects must henceforth be 
taken into account in this networking. First, networking defined at the level of 
behavioural expectations (rules, norms), and second networking occurring at 
the level of actual behaviour. It is the first type of networking in particular that 
is to be regarded as structure under the definition of structure explicated above. 
The second type of networking is to be regarded rather as an interaction pattern 
generated by this structure. The concrete action products of the democratic 
process are then naturally to be understood as the direct consequence of actual 
actions and interactions of collective actors. These interactions are characterized 
by, among other things, a more or less strongly developed and stable pattern. 88 
6. Political Structures and Political Performance 
The concept of political structures we have presented can prove fertile for 
empirical analysis only if concrete structures of the liberal democracies - the 
subject matter of the metatheory of the democratic process - are defined. This 
structure concept can provide the theoretical basis for this endeavour. Once the 
structures of individual liberal democracies have been concretely i.e., 
empirically established, they can serve as explanatory variables in considering 
the empirical phenomena of the democratic process. They include in particular 
the concrete expression of individual action products of the democratic process, 
and the question how strongly one action product determines another. The 
latter, for example, involves the question of the extent to which the demands 
articulated by the public system are taken into account in the action products of 
the actors of the polity (programmes, decisions etc.). Within the context of our 
metatheory we cannot deal with the concrete implementation of this 
explanatory strategy. We will merely address two general problems that arise in 
connection with such attempts at explanation, and which are frequently 
neglected in research. 
One of these problems is the meaningful specification of structure variables as 
explanatory variables. Which level in the hierarchy of political structures is 
relevant for which dependent variable? For example, is the responsiveness of 
political parties to the demands of the public system determined exclusively by 
the structure of the party system, or is it necessary to have recourse to a higher 
structural level covering intermediation system and governmental system 
(polity)? Or can the articulation of certain demands by interest groups be 
explained only by the structure of the subsystem of interest groups rather than 
by the structure of the public system as a whole? The second general problem is 
the meaningful specification of dependent variables that are to be explained by 
political structures. For the action products within the political system this is not 
particularly problematic. It is different with the outcomes that are intended to be 
achieved in its environment through the decision-making activities of the 
political system. Where Lijphart (1991), for example, explains diverse economic 
performances (economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment quotas) by 89 
means of varying structural arrangements in representative democracies
63, and 
in this regard recommends 'constitutional choices for new democracies', he is 
probably overestimating the possible effects of political action. In the same way 
as Sartori and Easton have criticized sociological reductionism in explaining 
political phenomena, it can be claimed that political science reductionism has 
been applied in explaining economic phenomena. In exact analogy to the 
political system, the economic system is a differentiated societal subsystem with 
its own structures and its own rationalities. And for this reason it can be 
assumed that the economic phenomena analysed by Lijphart can primarily be 
explained by means of endogenous economic system variables. This does not 
preclude political variables from having a certain explanatory value as well, but 
this can be empirically ascertained in a meaningful way only if explanation 
takes both economic and political variables into account (as far as the 
dependent variables mentioned above are concerned). If this is not the case, 
there is a risk of the explanatory model being incorrectly specified, producing 
distorted estimations of the effects of the variables taken into account in the 
explanatory model. 
Let us return to one of the central points of reference of the metatheory of the 
democratic process dealt with in our introductory chapter. With reference to 
Fukuyama's theses, we assume that the elimination of the fundamental 
alternative to the liberal democracies has brought the comparison between 
variants of liberal democracy to the fore. The criterion for comparison is 
political performance. To cite Almond and Powell (1978, 392): 'for professional 
political scientists the comparative study of political performance ought to be a 
central one'. The final issue in the metatheory of the democratic process is 
consequently the conceptual clarification of political performance. 
The political systems of the OECD countries have been described as perfor-
mance systems (see Chapter 4.2.1), and one of the characteristic features of per-
formance systems is the differentiation into roles of production of performance 
63 Lijphart posits four fundamental types of democracy that he uses in his explanation. Pre-
sidential democracies with majority systems or with proportional representation, and parlia-
mentary democracies with majority systems or with proportional representation. 90 
and roles of acceptance. On the basis of this differentiation of roles and the 
related generalized action orientations, a distinction has been drawn between a 
production system and an acceptor system, referred to in the metatheory as 
public and polity. From the analytical point of view of the production of 
performances, the intermediation system and the governmental system have 
thus been subsumed under the concept of polity and contrasted to the public
64. 
As we have defined this opposition, political performance can refer only to the 
action products of the polity, that is to say to the performances of the actors of 
the polity. These performances are, however, produced for the public, and the 
public (in its aspect as the collectivity of citizens) is, at least in normative 
democratic theory, the point of departure and the destination of performance 
production by the polity. These circumstances are determined in detail by the 
formal structures of the political systems of the liberal democracies, which also 
involve legal codification. Political performance thus refers to performance by 
the polity for the public, and the evaluation of this performance is thus 
undertaken from the point of view of the public. On the basis of the model of 
the democratic process (see Figure 2), the political performance of the polity can 
divide into two dimensions. The first dimension relates to the responsiveness of 
actors of the polity to the demands of the public at the input end of the 
democratic process, and the second dimension relates to the effectiveness of 
polity actors in implementing these demands at the output end of the 
democratic process. These two evaluation aspects must remain analytically 
separate, and must not be fused from the outset into one 'responsive 
effectiveness' or 'effective responsiveness'. In democratic theory there are 
differences of opinion on whether it is the responsiveness or the effectiveness of 
the polity that corresponds to the basic democratic norm. A distinction can be 
drawn between 'input-oriented' and 'output-oriented' democratic theories 
64 The concept of polity is broader than Easton's concept of regime (1965,190-211). Easton sees 
the regime structure as determined by 'the structure of the authority roles', the latter being 
characterized by the competence to make binding decisions. For Easton, the structure of the 
regime is therefore largely identical with the structure of the governmental system in our 
metatheory. Since the political parties as parties are invested with no such decision-making 
competence (only as incumbents of authority roles), they also cannot be assigned to either 
the governmental system or the regime. 91 
(Scharpf 1975,21,28). But is must also be empirically established which of these 
two performance aspects is the more important for the citizen in which 
situations. 
Figure 9: Categories of Political Performance 
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The responsiveness and effectiveness of polity actors can be described and 
evaluated from two points of view. What are the objective
65 facts, and how are 
they subjectively perceived by the citizens? It is certain that so-called objective 
responsiveness and effectiveness influence the citizens' subjective perception. 
But according to the metatheory of the democratic process, they are also 
influenced by definatory communication processes between interest groups, the 
mass media, and the competing political parties. A further influential factor is 
65 The 'objective' responsiveness of the polity can, for example, be measured by comparison of 
the demands of citizens empirically determined by surveys with the empirically determined 
taking into account of these demands in party platforms. Economic and social indicators 
could serve to establish 'objective' effectiveness. 92 
the selective perception of political information by the citizens themselves, 
controlled by their cognitive and evaluative schemata. For these reasons, the 
'objective' and 'subjective' levels must also be analytically separated, and it must 
be an empirical task to establish both the extent to which the objective 
responsiveness and effectiveness of the polity determines the subjective 
perception of the citizens and the explanatory value possessed by the other 
factors mentioned. The subjective perception of the responsiveness and 
effectiveness of the polity by the citizens is endowed with political relevance 
within the context of the democratic process in two regards. First through its 
consequences for the electoral behaviour of the citizens or for other forms of 
political participation, and second through its consequences for the generation 
of generalized support. The extent of generalized support for a political system 
is generally considered the most important determinant of the persistence of the 
system (see inter alios, Easton 1965, Grew 1978, Linz 1978, Lichbach 1981, 
Zimmermann 1981, Fuchs 1989). The stability or persistence of political systems 
is one of the fundamental issues in political science. The concept of persistence 
was introduced by Easton (1965, 211, 220 et seq.), who prefers the term to that 
of stability because it avoids the association with the static concept of 
permanence. On the contrary, according to Easton, the perpetuation of a 
political system is determined by its adaptability to societal change. In relation 
to the structure of political systems, this means that political systems persist if 
they preserve their fundamental and constituent structural characteristics while 
reacting to changing environmental conditions by altering relatively peripheral 
structural elements. The process-level performance categories of responsiveness 
and effectiveness can thus complemented by the system-level performance 
categories of generalized support and system persistence (see Figure 9). 
In our opinion there are two reasons for regarding the generation of generalized 
support of the polity by the citizens as a special category of political 
performance. First because of the salience of this variable for the persistence of 
the political system, and second because of its relevance for questions of 
normative democratic theory. Generalized support refers to an attitude towards 
the democratic process as a whole and to the structures that control this 93 
process. The extent of generalized support is therefore a criterion for the 
realization of the democratic basic norm ('popular sovereignty') by means of 
actually democratic processes that is more informative than polity 
responsiveness and effectiveness with regard to individual demands of 
citizens
66. At the level of everyday political processes, specific dissatisfaction is 
self-evident and necessary for the dynamics of these processes. Both with 
regard to the analytical aspect of political system persistence and to the 
normative aspect of realizing popular sovereignty, the decisive question is 
whether and to what extent such specific dissatisfaction becomes generalized. 
And that means going beyond the current collective actors of the polity to 
encompass more general objects of the political system, and finally the political 
system as a whole. 
The concept of generalized support has been developed on the basis of Easton's 
(1965, 1975) concept of diffuse support, and used in empirical analysis (Fuchs 
1989; Fuchs 1993; Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1993). However, it is to be 
distinguished from diffuse support in two essential aspects. Easton (1975) posits 
two sources for the development of diffuse support. The first is mechanisms of 
primary socialization, and the second subsequent experience with the 
performance of actors of the polity. According to Easton (1975, 444^148), such 
experience is merely a source of the development of diffuse support, but this 
attitude exists only once it has freed itself from this source and become 
unspecific, and in this sense diffuse. In the case of the concept of generalized 
support, by contrast, the assumption is that ongoing modernisation processes 
have led to a diminution in the efficacy of primary socialization and the 
superimposition of adult experience. As with Easton, experience with the 
performance of polity actors constitutes a source for the development of 
generalized support, but in contrast to Easton we assume that this source for 
the development of attitudes does not disappear in the resulting attitude but 
66 In the last resort it naturally depends on the concrete issue which of the defined categories of 
political performance are involved. If this performance involves, for example, solving a cer-
tain problem by state action, then performance category B in Figure 9 will be the relevant 
one. If, on the other hand, reference is to explaining the electoral behaviour of the citizens, 
then performance categories C and D will be relevant. 94 
survives, albeit in generalized form. This means, for example, that a positive 
attitude towards polity stmcrures or towards the polity as a whole is not so 
much indicate a diffuse (psychological) attachment to object as dependence on 
specific valuation criteria that characterize the attitude as such. These valuation 
criteria can be expressive, moral, and instrumental in nature. Differing forms of 
generalized support can be distinguished depending on which of these 
valuation criteria are used to generate experience
67, and which therefore con-
stitute the basis for generalization (see Fuchs 1989, 1993). Which of the three 
fundamental valuation standards for appraising political events is in fact 
currently dominant among citizens, and which form of generalized support is 
consequently the politically relevant and effective one is a question research has 
still to answer. Disregarding these differentiated aspects of generalized support, 
it does in principle, as generalized support, act as a buffer against everyday and 
concrete dissatisfaction in a comparable manner to Easton's diffuse support
68. 
Nevertheless the concept of generalized support involves the assumption of 
relatively greater dependence on political performance at the process level than 
is the case with Easton. This assumption also implies that the stabilization of 
generalized support (or generation, where necessary) is a permanent task of 
polity actors. This stabilization is founded not only on what these actors 
produce, but also how they produce it, that is to say how they bring forth their 
action products
69. How the elimination of the fundamental system alternative 
affects the generation and sustenance of various forms of generalized support 
for liberal democracies is an important and unanswered question. In the 
introductory chapter we have already stated our conjecture in this respect. 
Specific dissatisfaction becomes more rapidly generalized than was previously 
67 Experience is almost always had in the light of valuation standards i.e., experience 
determined purely by cognition is possible only in borderline cases. 
68 The concept of generality is defined essentially in terms of indifference towards concreteness 
and specificity. Once generalized political system support forms have been established, they 
enjoy a certain degree of resistance to disappointment at the level of day-to-day politics due 
to this indifference. The decisive question, especially for new democracies, is that 
generalized support for these democracies can be developed, and it is a matter involving 
considerable preconditions, as we know from historical experience. 
69 This dimension of the behavioural style of polity actors in producing their action products 
involves, among other things, the issue of political morality. 95 
the case, but this generalization does not lead to the liberal democratic system 
as such being called into question, but only to the question whether there are 
structural alternatives within the system permitting better performance at the 
process level. 
In conclusion we ask how the metatheory of the democratic process is to be 
categorized as a theoretical venture. Alexander's scientific continuum merely 
allows location between the poles of 'metaphysical environment' and 'empirical 
environment', and provides directives on how and from what standpoints such 
a metatheory can be elaborated. A schema by von Beyme (1991, 346) permits a 
somewhat more precise categorisation as theoretical approach in the political 
field. After a comprehensive overview of the 'Theory of Politics in the 20th 
Century', he simplifies the multifarious theoretical approaches by spanning a 
two-dimensional space along the two axes system approach/actor approach 
and macro level/micro level. The two extremities of this space, described by 
von Beyme as cul-de-sac, are occupied by the autopoetic systems theories (in 
the systems approach/macro level cell), and orthodox behaviourism (in the 
actor approach/micro level cell). The metatheory presented here relates in von 
Beyme's terminology to 'classical systems theory
1 and to 'rational choice' i.e., 
two theoretical approaches each of which von Beyme sees as having potential in 
its own right. One problem in applying the two approaches is the 'leap' from 
the actor level to the systems level and from the micro level to the macro level 
and vice versa (von Beyme 1991, 344 et seq.). In the metatheory of the 
democratic process the attempt has been made to reduce these leaps at least 
conceptually by means of as systematic an integration of systems approach and 
actor approach as possible. It remains to be seen how successful this attempt 
has been. Above all, however, this attempt at integration must prove its worth 
in empirical studies guided by the metatheory. Bibliography 
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